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INTRODUCTION 
'Ihe dawning of a new t::poch in Geman history came with the 
assumption of power by Adolf Hitler in 19JJ. Both Otto I as the 
Holy Roman EEperor in 963 and likewise Otto von Bismarck through the 
unification of Gennany in 1871 had striven to bring about complete 
hamony. But these two Reichs fell into ruin as the dissident elf'lllents 
of each of the thirty-nine "Germanies" fought for sovere1 gn ty. Hitler, 
however, won the nearly unanimous support of his own people and so 
rose to heights of unparallelled power, But as Lord Acton wrote to 
Bishop Creighton, ''Power tends to corrupt and absolute power cor-
1 
rupts absolutely." 
Before World War I the European world had been traumatized by 
nationalism and racism, Aftf:"r the war the Diktat of the Treaty of 
Versailles (1919) engulfed Germany into a cruel and humiliating peace. 
The clause imposed upon the Gennan people which claimed that they alone 
were responsible "for causing all the loss and da.111ages to which the 
Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals" had been s:...l·-
jected both shocked and frustrated the defeated Genr.ans, 2.nd t<t rr.ak.E: 
matters even worse, the Fburteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson 
which had promised a fair peace to be guaranteed by a League of 
1 
"Letter to Bishop Creighton in Acton, Historical Essays and 
Studies, n. 6, quoted in Jacques Barzun a.'ld Henry F. Graff, The Modern 
R~_:r;cher, Rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World., 19?0) pp. 
141-42. 
1 
2 
2 Nations fail ed. to restore hannony to their ~hat terea. world, 
Nor did the Weimar Constitution of 1919, esta.blishing a govern-
ment that reluctantly signed that treaty, solve the problem of smaJ1 
splinter parties from multi plying increasingly, In March of 1920, 
a putsch drove the government from Berlin for several days. As Dr, 
G, M, Gilbert, the prison psychiatrist at Nurnberg during the period 
of the Trials,3 stated, "A reversion to authoritarian rule after a 
/, 
too drastic attempt to impose democracy on an authoritarian culture"._ 
was bound to occur, Secret terrorist groups of the Right bE-.§3-n a 
campaign of assassination which included t'x: August, 1921, murder of 
Matthias Erzberger, the Catholic Center politician who had sigr1ed the 
anni~tic2 to end the hostility and bloodshed in Europe, 
During this time the "National Socialist Party of the German 
workflrs "5 led by Adolf Hitler the son of an obscure, iJ..ler.itimate 
Austrian customs official, emerged in Bavaria, 3orn in 1229, 
Schicklgruber (Adolf Hitler) quarreled with his fathc:r much of the 
time. 6 He always see.med a bitter and frustrated person. During his 
early teens his hatred for Jews sprang forth, PromptFd by 'tr.e VhmrH::~, 
Mayor Leuger whom Hitler admired as his favorit~ tutor, Hitlc~ 
2Crane Brinton, J, B. Christopher, and. IL, L. Wolff, ! P.:sto..:::::. 
f Ci • 1 i J • Jd ed l 2 ( D..gl ' r1 • J:•;; " • - · . .. • Q___ vi. za1.1on, , , vo • L!J.!1 ewooo. ... _ i_ ~ :. • ,, , '.: :· :-:-sr ... 1ci 
Hn.11, 1967), pp. 357-580. 
JThe German name for the city where the llazi pc:rty r2lliu.-; 
were held is Niirnberg. Anglicized, Nurnberg becomes Ihrr,.:-.bc:-:·. '.·:.~ 
Nuremberg Trials were held from 14 November 1945 until 1 Lc:ctm::· t9<~ .• 
4Gustave I·ark Gilbert, The Psvcho1,or:y~12 (Nc1-r Yu:; : 
::tonald Press Co, , 1:>50), p. 5. 
;: 
·The Party i.s callnd "Nazi'' as an abbr,.vi:~· ,;c; .. C'i' '..~ ,; w·:-~':1 ;·l· ; ·'' 
J 
"associated socialism with the .Jews and lumped both together as some-
how responsible for his own personal troubles and for the ills of the 
world. ,,7 The w:rltinc;s of the French Count Joseph Arthur Gobineau 
(1816-1882) 1 responsiblE· for laying down the "pseudo-scientific 
foundation for modern theories of 'Nordic' and 'Aryar,' supremacy, 118 
also greatly infl.uenced Hitler. He began to see in the world around 
him that the Semitic elements coupled with the Teutonic race were 
responsible for destroying the Germanic civilization. In his mind he 
wanted his "fellow Germans" to fight for more living space, Lebensraurr.. 
This also meant for Hitler the elimination of the money lenders and 
bankers who were predominately Jewish. 
Hitler's bizarre personality combined with his antagonistic 
atti.tudes toward the Jews and his belief that the German people were 
supnne prompted his eventual takeover of thf-: goVE.'rr...ment in 1933 as 
virtucl dictator. As early as 1921 he had made hirr.self the Ftlhrer of 
the Na ticnal Socialist party or Nazi for short. During thE nf-;Xt. two 
years inflation struck the Weimar Republic due to the political 
maneuvPrs of' the government under iTuert who failed to meet the incr£~asinc 
threat from the Right. 9 Hitler, who claimed to be followir.g a middlr 
coursf' between the extreme Right, the Communists or: tbe Left, brok( in tu 
a ri1.):t-winc political meeting in a .Munich beer-hall in l\ovrnber 7, 
1923 <::i.nd proclaimed that the "national revolution" had begur:. SentEenccd 
7Brintcn, et.al., Histon:: of Ci~ilization, p. 4,51. 
· 
8roid. 
4 
to five y1,ars inprisonment for disruptive political acti,1ities, Hitler 
only spent five months in jail where he wrote tle_in Kampf'. lo 
The end of inflation was near in 1924 due to the extraordinary 
financial powers of Hans Luther, a minister of finance, and Hjalmar 
Schacht, banker and fiscal expert. In 1925 after President Ebert died, 
Paul von Hindenburg was elected a.s President. During this same year 
Gennany signed the Locarno treaties which took the French armies out 
of the Rhineland, substituting a neutral 2".0ne and a frontier guaranteed 
by Britain in Italy, and setting up machinery for the arbitration of 
disputes between Gennany and her neighbors. These treaties did not, 
however, extend Poland's and Czechoslovakia's frontiers with Germany, 
Gennany was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926 with a permanent 
seat on the League's Council, In 1929 Gennany accepted the Kellogg-
Briand Pact which outlawed aggressive war. 
Depression hit Gemany in 1929-31 mainly as a result of the 
American stock market crash on Wall Street in New York City. Noi1 foreio 
credits on which prosperity had so largely rested (owing to the Dawes 
and Young Plans) collapsed, Henry Morgenthau criticized these two plans 
10 This book is said to be the chief ideology of Hitler's 
theoretical as well as actual plans carried out to the utrn.:)st degree, 
It is also said to be the chief indoctrination by which the Naz3 leader; .. 
ran Gennany, George Creel asserted that the ideas in Mein Kampf were 
"first written by Hegel, I•'ichte, Clausewitz, Treitschkc, and Nietzscnc ••• " 
(See George Creel, War CriminaJ.s and Punishment [New York: Robert 
McBride & Co. , 1944 J , p, 8.) In the Trials themselves the Prosecutim" 
stated that Nazi aggression was contained. in Mein ¥.ampf and used as 
r:;vidence against them. (See Office of United States Chief of Counsd 
Fbr Pro~9cution of Axis Criminality, NazLSill.§J?:lr£~£;! ar~;ior.' ~.· 
vol, 1 [Washington, D, c.: Government }'rintL'1G Office, 1946.J , pp. 
18?-88. 
5 
because the United States was building up Gennany and at the same Hme, 
Ge t i . . h t• 11 
·rmany was no pay ng c.acK er repara ions. During this time the 
publicist and journalist, Paul Joseph Goebbels, indoctrinated the 
elite black-shirted. SS (Schutzstaffel, or defense corps) which believed 
solely in racial purity. The climate was now ripe for action. 
Schleicher resigned his position as Chancellor early in 1933. 
Franz v on Papen, a rich Catholic nobleman and a member of the con-
serva ti ve Right, persuaded. Hindenburg to accpe t Hitler as Chancellor. 
As Chancellor, Hitler began to transform the government into a die-
tatorship. Hitler was thP. chief boss and his favorites served him as 
12 political cronies with a particular emphasis on "mob psychology". 
From the dictatorship of Hitler's Third Reich and the Second •·10::-T'"' 
War raciSlJl 3.Ild nationalism were at work within Germany. Nazi politicai 
theory along with the build up of industry under the Fbur Year Plan, 
de-Christianization of religion and culture, distrust of Soviet Ru::.sia, 
German reannament (1935-36), the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, the 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938-39, and finally the invasion 
of Poland. in 1939 in a blitzkrieg brought the major pa.rt of the Western 
World under the direction of Hitler and his Third :Reich. As a result., 
many people through:Jut E'Urope found themselves subject to ths Gcrnar .. 
11 ( Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany is Our Problem New York: 
Harper & Bros., 1945), p. 1)4. 
12William M, McGovern, From Luther to Hitler: The History 
of Fa.sci~j;.-Nazi Polit!_cal P~l0sophy (Boston: Houghton, Mfflin 
& Co., 1941), p. 672. 
6 
need for slave labor. While much responsibility lies with the Nazi 
leaders along with their chief, Hitler, the lack of unity among Britain, 
France, and the United States, and the failure of the League of Nations 
were contributing forces which allowed this evil development. 
The Third Reich established by Adolf Hitler, like the former two, 
collapsed totally, resulting in V-E day (8 May 1945) when Germany and 
her allies were at last defeated. The 1000 years of the third Reich, 
to which Hitler continuaJ..ly referred in his inflammatory speeches, 
lay p:rostrat~ and the feathers of the golden eagle fell under the heavy 
boots of occupation armies. The United States of America, the French 
Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet 
SocialiGt Republics wanted not only to disestablish the German Nazi 
dictatorship, but they aJ.so sought to imprint forever in the minds o} 
the Gcrma;-, people an indelible picture of their leaders' guilt. Justicc, 
Robert H. Jackson declared in his opening speech at the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal& 
We have no purpose to incriminate the whole German people, 
We know that the Nazi Party was not put into power by a 
majority of the Geman vote, but by an alliance of extreme 
Nazis, German reactionaries, and the most aggressive of mili-
ta.ricts .13 
The purpose of this study is to give a surrJ11ation of the Nuremberg 
Trials (14 November 1945--1 October 1946) in which twenty-fo:r "r.:ajor 
l3Interru:.tional Military Tribunal., Trial of the Major War 
Criminals Before the International ?tdlita Tribunal Nurember , 
14 r;cvcr:,ber 194j--1 October 194 , vol • .2 Nurembers, 1947 , pr1. 102-10). 
( h•!roafter r·~ferred to as IMT.J ; See also L'ugene I:avidson, The Dcatr\ 
and L:!. fo of Geman : An Account of' the American Occupation (Ne•-t Yo::ck: 
Al fri:- ci /i • K.110 pf, l 9 1 , p , 1 OJ • 
7 
war cr.i.r.linaJ.s" were tried at the Pal.ace of Justice :i.n Nuremberg, Ger-
many; to prove that Sauckel and Speer were guilty of the crimes they 
were convicted of under the London Charter; to present the moral. and 
legal aspects; and lastly, to present a general. purview of the Nurem-
berg decision in light of the primary and secondary sources consul t~;,d. 
Principally, the thesis of the author is: From the German documentary 
evidence captured by the Allied forces upon taking Berlin, Fritz 
Sauckel and Albert Speer were gull ty of the crimes that convicted them 
under the London Charter. 
CHAPTER I 
PRECEDENTS FOR THE TRIAL 
Since the beginning of mankind, there has been no adequate 
precedent for a trial of "war criminals." However, wr:t ters have 
pointed to various instances throughout history where the victors 
have tried some of the vanquished. The Tribunal that was established 
in 1945 referred to the only modern precedent of this kind, namely, 
the trial of Henri Wirz, the commandant of Andersonville Prisoner-
of-War Camp during the Civil War, by a U.S. military tribunal in 
Washington, The u. S, Government indicted him for causing the death 
of many prisoners during the American Civil War. He was convicted of 
having violated the laws and customs of war and thereby executed. 1 
Wirz had been tried under Article 59 of the "Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field" of 24 Aprn 15':: ~ 
according to which prisoners-of-war were liable to prosecution for cr:im' s 
2 
they had committed before their capture. But this trial was national, 
not international, 
Robert K. Woetzel has pointed out other cases from the more 
distant past: 
F'rom the reports of Xenophon it can be gleaned that after the 
1Wilboum E, Benton and George Grimm, eds., Nurember~: G::rrnar: 
V~ws of the War Trial,!. (Dallass Southern fl'iethodist University Frcss, 
1955), p. 128, 
? 
'-Robert K. Woetzel, The Nurer.iberg Trials in Inbrnationn.1 La~:, 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1 §bo), p. 26. 
8 
9 
destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotamos in 405 B,C. 
by the Lacedaemonian admiral Lysander, the victor called to-
gether his allies in order to determine the fate of the prisoners. 
The Athenians among the prisoners were accused of a number of 
actual and planned war crimes, and they were all sentenced to 
death, except for Adeimantus who is supposed to have opposed 
the plan for commission of brutalities in the event of a 
victory) 
In 1474 Sir Peter of Hagenbach was tried by a war crimes tribunal. 
Hagenbach pleaded "superior's orders," but the trib'W1B.l sentenced 
4 him to death anyway. Just as it would be difficult to draw a parallel 
between the trials of antiquity and the HlT,5 so too it would be hard 
to regard Hagenbach's case as a true precedent for the IMT. 6 Then 
there was a 1 796 Ehglish case which sustained a conviction for the 
furnishing of unwholesome food to French prisoners to the discredit 
of the King, The argument was rejected that the act had not been 
perpetrated "in breach of any contract with the public or of any moral 
or civil duty,"7 Similar decisions have occurred in states of the U.S. 
which administer the common law of crimes and have prosecuted offenses 
by ind.i viduals against the law of nations without prior statutory 
prohibition of such acts,8 
The ostracism of Napoleon Bonaparte represents an interesting 
3 Ibid. t p. 17. 
4 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
5 Ibid. , p. 19. 
6 Ibid •• p. 22. 
7Ibid. 
8 Ibid., p. 2). 
10 
Q 
instance where joint action was taken to punish the loser." "In the 
limited sense that the IMT was set up by the four major Powers for the· 
disposition of the German wartime leaders, thr~ case of Napoleon could 
10 be regarded as a precedent." 
During World War I a list of 4,900 "war criminals" including 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, Hindenburg, Ludendorf~ and Bethmann Hollweg (even-
tually lowered to about a dozen) was brought forth, but there was no 
11 trial after the war by an international tribunal. Nillions of peopli 
in Britain, France, and America held Wilhelm II personally responsi blc 
for the war and "Wilhelm II's desire to excuse himself was heightened 
9Ibid.; See also Davidson, Death and Life of Gennany, p. 100; 
Sheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War (l;ew York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 9. 
10woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 24. 
11 Eue;f',ne Davidson, The Trial of the Germans: An AccoU!:t of' ~h· 
Tw€ntv-two Defendants Before the International Eilita • Tribunal r.;t 
rurenberg New York: llacmillan, 19 6 , p. ); Sheldon Glueck irr.(i.in:: 
thn t the Allied countries favored these Germans for trial. (Se~' ;)D,r ·.1 C:•.: 
Glueck, War Criminals: UbeL: Prosecution and Punish.rnent] Hew York: 
Alfred Ao Knopf, 1944 , pp. 24, 37); "But Williara II was to 0(· chu.:rc;i·~ 
on r1oral and political grounds in a legal procef'ding, while ai. liurcr1·uef. 
trH'c df-0 fendants were accused of having committed crinE'S agaim:.t intc1-
na tional law a.nd the law and customs of warfare, In that sonsr;, the 
proposf;d tribunal could not be regarded as a prececi.cnt for the J:I:'.: • 
On the other hand, the 'mixed commissions' before which persons who 
had committed illegal acts against several nations were to be tric<l, 
comes closer to bE:ing a precedent for the IET; but they would have· 
appJ iPd the procedures and definitions of crimes cor.tained ir: i..hf. 
rnili tary penal codes of the nations participating in the n,spf~ct:i. vc 
trial, while the Nuremberg court applied the law of th€ Cr~::.rt• l of ~~" 
n:T." (See Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 35.) He. conclud<?c ~.h:.t ;.!,. ~·( 
is "no exact precedent for the IHT at NurembErg," roid., p. JS, S' ;_ c.l.~w 
Geor~e A. Finch, "The Nuremberg Trial and International Law," Ancrlc<.:J 
Jou_'Y'!laJ. of International Law 41 (January 1947); 35; HPrmar; Pblrgcr, 
"Nurer:-tbcrg--A F'air Trial? Dynamic Law," Atlantic Lo:r.thly 17:7 (f,pril 
19h6): 6). 
11 
by the campaign which had sprung up in Eng.land to bring him to trial 
12 
as a 'war criminal.,'" 'lbe Allies decid.ed to try him, but the Dutch 
said that they would not give up the exilro Kaiser to the Allies because 
Holland was not a signatory o:f the Versailles Treaty. Finally, after 
much argumentatial, the Allies yielded to the Dutch refusal.13 
Nevertheless, there was a trial of some German leaders by the 
G€nnan govemment in 1921 a.t Leipzig. Six out of sixteen of the de-
fendants were found guilty, but those who were sentenced to jail were 
14 
released within a short period of time. Writing many years later, thr 
Secretary of the Treasury under Roosevelt, declared that these trials 
had been absura..15 Consequently, among the methods for a trial, "the 
alternative of using German courts had little support. Men remembered 
Leipzig and wished no recurrence of the legal scandal perpetrated 
there. 16 Hence, in the minds of the four signatories of the London 
Agreement of 8 August 1945 that established the Tribunal to try "major 
12v1rginia Spencer Cowles, The Kaiser (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1963), p. 407. 
l3Ibid., pp. 414-16; See also Ellg;ene Ia.vidson, Th.e Nuremberg 
Fallacy: Wars and War Crimes Since World War II (New York: Mac-
millan Co., 1963), p. 13; Idem, Death and Life of Gennany, p. 100; 
William J. Bosch, Jud ent on Nurember : American Attitudes 'l'oward 
the 1".ajor German War-Crimes Trials Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1970), p. 6. 
14 Davidson, Death and Life of Germany, p. 101. 
15r.iorgenthau, f!ermany is Our, Problem, PP• )-4. 
16Bosch, Ju<!grnent on Nuremberg, p. 9; Glueck, War Criminals, 
pp. 31-2; J. H. Morgan asserted that the Leipzig trials of 1921 
were "farcical," in J. H. Morgan, The G·reat Assize: An Examination 
of th1~ Law of the Nuremberg Trlals-TICndon:- John Viurray, 1948), -:r~· 3: 
Woetzel, Nururiber1; I'rials, p. ~16; Quin::::,y ~Jricht, "International Law 
and Gull t by Association," American Journal of International Law l~J 
(October 1949) i 7 53 • ---
1? 
war criminals" was th8 ubiquitous and perplexing fact that before this 
Agreement, there were no true precedfonts specifying "trial of major 
war criminals" except the Moscow Declaration a:r:d other conferences 
17 during the war. 
In 19l-1j many individuals in the U.S. State Departmentan:i ad-
ministration supported a trial •18 Since the end of the Trials the rr:ajori t:,· 
of international lawyers have also favored the Tribu..11al. 19 The American 
people themselves resented the atrocites of the German leaders durine 
th d b 1 • d th t th h uld b . h d . 2 0 e war an e J.E . Ye a · ey s o e punis e ir; some way. 
In 1945 Henry Morgenthau issued his "plan 11 for turninc Gcr:::ai::y 
into an agricultural country, "depriving Germa.'1y of all hFavy in-
21 dustries." He gave figures and statistics to support his "plan 11 , 
.,~. 
which he claimed would produce a final peace .. 1...t: He stated that a dic-
armed Germany would be r,a.fer to world security. 23 
Morgenthau proposed that the Nazi leaders be E:xccuh.d as the 
d 1 ti t hi " l " f' t . ha 24 en so~u on o s p .an or res·oring rmony. 
1? Consult i\ppendix C for the London Agreemer;"':. 
18 
'Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg, p. 39. 
19Ibid., p. 40, 
20 Bosch, Ju~nt on NurembPr5, p. Thac:..-: h ari(i l~ 1 f<" 
-~-,~-·~-"~ _..._'<'·-~---
of Germany, pp. 55-6. 
21 Horgenthau, Germany is Our Problem, p. 1(; See ah:o Boser, 
Judgment on Nuremberg, p. 82. 
22Morgenthau, Germany is Our l?robh:r:-i, pp. xi:.-xiii, :_s-tl, 1-1-P-t ~·-
23Ibid., p. 187. 
24Ibid., p. Js E\1gene Clitton GurrJ.Z,rt, !~~ricr:.'::_; J1ci'::Jcat•: 
RobP.rt H. Jackson (bdianapolisi bobbs-:.cr::::.L. '..!o., .:D.c., ::;;:;8), 1 • 
13 
Stimson, Secretary of War, arguF:d that the leaders of Nazi Germany 
should bt' given a fair trial. The majority of American poeple as 
well as the other victorious powers supported Stimson's views. Like-
wise the governments of these countries backed public feelings. With-
out much ado Stimson won his cause for a trial. 25 Throughout the war 
itself, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill together had warn0d 
the Germans that they would be held accountable for "war crimes. 1126 
On 1 Novembf;r 19ll-J, the U .s. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, Molotov, 
and Eden signed the .t-ioscow Declaration, promising a "trial of war 
criminals" but naming no one. 27 At Potsdam on 17 August 1945, Stalin 
~r> 
appeared with a list of those to be tried as "major war criminals. ,,c.·_·, 
Nd tbr:r the· Arnr:ricans nor the British objected to the well-known Nazi 
~· leari•'T~;• trial--including such menas Goring, Hess, Ribb12ntrop, 
Keitel, ;£r,i tz, Kal ten brunner, Frick, Streicher, Krupp, Schacht, '"- ~ 
von PapEn, This list was adopted by the Allied on 1 August 1945. 
25Bosch, Jud ent on 1·.urember , p. 8; Jay W. 
From };~rcmberg,~Lai Lexington, Massachusetts: 
& Co.' 1972), pp. 14-25. 
26 Davidson, Trials of the Germans, p. 6. 
Baird, ~d., 
D. C. HPath 
27Ibid •• n. 5; Woetzel. Nuremberg Trials, pp. i.J.-5; fi"'.JJ·[,er 
"Nur'":m berg- -A :Fair Trial?" p. 61 ; Eur ray C. Bernays, "Legal Bad~· 
of the l~uremberg Trials," SurvE~y Graphic 35 (January 1946): 13; 
Jesse Joseph Silvergate, "The Role of the Conspiracy Doctrh;E ir, 
the liun·mberg War Crimes Trials," Ph. D. dissertation, Ur..ivt::rni't,y 
of Wisconsin, 1969 (Ann Arbor, ~lichigan: University Viicrofi1ms, 
1970), pp. 20-1; Viscount Viaugha.'11, U.N.O. and War Grines, fos'Lscr.:.;:,:, 
by Lord Hank.Py (London: John !-iurray, 1951), p. 25. 
') P. 
' ''Brin ton, et al. , History of Civil~ zation, p. _541; 
Silvergatrc, "Conspiracy Ibctrine," pp. 22,25. 
14 
:>n 
With the roundup of the Nazi leaders· " after Berlin was smri.~;h0d 
by the Allies in early 1945, the "major war criminals" were brought 
before the International Military Tribunal in the Gernan city of 
Nurnber~O which had stood since 1933 as the syn:bol of the victories 
of the Third Reich. 'Ihe Allies had destroyed much of this city by 
bombings on 21 April 1945. It was not chosen as the place for the 
trial because Hitler had failed to make it the principal city of 
the Nazis, but because Nuremberg offered the best accommodations 
of any city in Germany. ThP. large Palace of Justice on thr, wio;stem 
edge of the city had escaped with little damage during the wa.r.31 
The Russians, who WE.re against the trial being held anywhere elsE· but 
in Berlin, reluctantly agreed. 
Not only did the chief Nazi leaders have to be apprehi:;nded and 
brought to justice, but also the truckloads of German govc r:::::, nt 
29'Ihe four signatories were responsible for capturir.g thr 0 
"najor war criminals." The U.S. took custody of Fritz Sauckr:l ori 
10 Eay 19i.15 with his place of internment at BrJrchtesgad(~n. Th<, 
British placf'd Albert Speer in Gleveksburg on 23 Lay 1945. (See 
Officro of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis 
Criminality, Hazi Conspiracy and Aggressiop, 8 vo:J..s, (Washington, D. C. : 
Govcr~ment Printing Office, 1946-48], 2:1083.) \licreaftc:r n.forrcc 
to as NCi1,] See also William Hamsher, Albert ~ccr--Victi~ of l~u:t''._ct·u~'­
(London: Leslie Fn~win, 1970), p. 6; SpEcer was takir,g a b<.. :.!~ at t.L· 
time of his canturc in Ibid. , p. 219; Al bt~rt Speer, Insid(. th0 Tn ·:rd 
Reich: Iierr.oir~, trans, by R:i.chard and Clara Winston\:1kw :ork: ----
Eacmillan Co. , 1970), p. 500, Davidson d<,scri bed the roi.mG.~-.:· b1 
some detail in Davidson, Trial of the Gerr::ans, p. 20. 
30'Ihis city was the sight of the famous Gen.an pain ':,(;r, 
Albrecht Druer an:1 the Protestant center during the ?.eforma:.ior:. 
Lying on the Pegnitizy River, ninety-two r:iiles northwest o:· :.unicb, 
Nuremberg is the second largest city in Bavaria. (;:>E:;e Cecil Heaclla:, 
The Story of Nuremberg (London: J. I·:. Ient & Co., 1399 J . : , v:M.cb 
is an old but yet an accurate accou..11t of the history of Nu:.::-0:-:°t)erg. 
31Peter Calvocoressi, Nuremb0rc;: '::'le· F;c1cts, th,, :i .. c-.w, and ttv' 
Conseguences (London: Chatto ana Windus, 19h7), p. (;; D.:...vic..:.;'.Jn, 'irial 
of tb_~ Germans, p. 19. 
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documents had to be translated and studied; the roundup of witnesses 
from the wreckage of the fallen Gennan Reich, from the fori~c:::- con-
ccntra.tion camps, from the prisoner-of-war st.ockages of neutral and 
Allied countries had to take place so that the evidence could be 
brought before the eyes of everyone. Eugene Davidson stated: 
To punish those guilty of the murder of mil.lions of com-
batants, to evidence the continuing collaboration of the 
victorious Allies, to establish once and for all in a 
court of law the personal responsibility of political and 
nili tary leade:r;:; for the crime::; of aggn;ssive warfare and 
of a totalitarian Fascist st.ate against its own pr:ople "-nd 
those of foreign countries--that is what Anc rican officials 
in Washington and London and Nuremberg told their allies, 
as well as the Ge mans and neutrals, the Allies had been 
fighting for,32 
The difficulty arose as to how the massive amount of nater:i.a1, 
due to the meticulous efforts of the German govern.r,ie:nt, was to be 
handled. It had. to be read by a staff of intcrpreti:::rs only after 
it was complied and integrated. In the Nuremberg story of 1945-l;.6, 
'). ':· 
then; arc more than fifty volumes of documentary mati::rial ,··0 
32Davidson, Trial of_ih.£ Germans, p. 2. 
33see TI>IT, 42 vols.; NCJ\, 8 vols,; and. also two suppl0:·:cntary 
volwM:'!s, Office: of United States Chief of :o1.Z1f~c1 io!· Trosc:::Jt:i.oL 
of Axis ~:riminaJ.ity, Nazi 9on:'2J.?iTil;S:L~nd .!.:J'/7E"~:-.;ior. ,_ Cphiic·:. <..i.!!U 
1ud ·· .. t ( 1·/ --h· to DC • Go ' --., t r.,;, .... ;r"' (H·.r·.;c · :c '"'l ·· nd v p;m::.::!.'~ fa._, 1ng n f • , o VfoTI1i.1',rl i ;. ····' '-~•'u ' ... - f: J • /'• · / I U·•· · 
Nazi Cop.s12iracy and Aggress:l.OJ:l (Washincton, J.C.: .::;cvc:r.·.n::·:.-:.: l':clu ~in.::; 
On.e.o 1••,J.r; ) 1l J.CE: t . /•;.b, 
CHAPTER II 
'IRE LONOON CHARTER OF 8 AUGUST 1945 
Up to now thel.-e appeared to be so sufficient precedents in 
intema tional. 12w specifying a "trial of war criminals." L. Op-
penheim stated that the law of nations is binding.1 Throughout his-
tory men have wr1 tten on just and unjust wars. The Romans held a 
doctrine of ~ta belli. 2 Toward the beginning of the Middle Ages, 
writers such as St. Augustine voiced their opimons. St. Augustine 
asserted that three justa causa of war existed: (1) recovery of pro-
perty, (2) vengeance, and (J) punishment of one's enemies.3 St. Thomas 
4 Acquinas opposed the lies and violations of war. 
Later writers such as Francisco Vitoria (1480-1,546), Hugo 
Grotius (1583-1645), Christian von Wolff (1679-17.54 ), Emmerich de Vattel 
c (1714-67), and others contributed. to the body of international law/ 
Of these renowned men, Hugo de Groot or Grotius of Holland became known 
11. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 8th ed., edited by 
H. Lautcrpacht, vol. 1 1 Peace (New York: I.avid McKay, Co. , 1967), pp. 
4-5. See also Carl Philip Jessup, A Modem Law of Nations; An Introduction 
(New Yorks fl'.a.cmillan Co., 1948) and J. L. Brierly, The Law of Natior[': 
An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th ed. , cdi ted by 
Sir Humphrey Waldock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
2 Benton and Grimm, eds., German Views of the Trials, p, 5; Woetzel, 
Nuremberg Trials, p. 124; Baird, From Nurembezw, to My Lai, p. 116. 
)Benton and Grimm, eds., Gennan Views of the Trials, p, 8; 
Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 12 • 
4Benton and Grimm, eds., German Vi,ews of the Trials, p, 8; 
Woetzel, Nuremb~rg Trials, pp. 126-27. 
%enton and Grimm, eds., Gennan Views of the Trials, p, 9, 
16 
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as the "Father of Intemational Law". His celebrated and monumental 
work is De jure belli ac pacis {1625-27). He dealt with the causes of 
war, reducing the causes of lawfUl wars to defense of person or pro-
6 perty and the punishment of offenders. Vattel claimed that self-de-
fense, redress of injury, and punishment of offenses are justa causa 
for war. 7 
Besides the writing of men on international law, J. L. Brierly 
listed other sources of international law such as customs, treaties, 
judicial precedents, general principles, and rea.son.8 Oppenheim has 
a good deal of infonnation on the subject of what constitutes inter-
national law, also.9 In an appendix to his work, Creel gave the "Rule::; 
of Land Warfare" of the Hague Convention of 1907 •10 Article 56 of the 
"Rules" stated that 
All seizure of, and destruction, or intentional damage done 
to such institutions, historical monuments, works of art and 
science, is forbid.den, and should be made the subject of legal 
proceed.ings.11 
However, the "Rules" did not specify the exact legal proceedings nor 
the degree of punishment. Furthermore, they did not include punishment 
6 Brierly, The Law of Nations, p. 32; Oppenheim, International 
Law, vol. 1, pp. 6, 84-5, 91; Bosch, Jud.gment on Nuremberg, p. 60; 
Woetz~l, Nuremberg Trials, pp. 128-29; Maugham, U.N.O. and War Crimes, 
p. 86, 
?Brierly, '!he Law of Nations, p, 39, 
8 Ibid., pp. 57-66. 
9see Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1. 
10 Creel, War Criminals, pp. 288-91. 
11Ib., 1.Q •• p. 91. 
for violations against humanity or peace which the Tribunal was later 
to place in the Indictment counts. 
12 Treaties such as the Geneva Convention stipulations, the Geneva 
Protocol of 1924,1) and the previous Article 228 of the Versailles 
Treaty, the Tribunal recognized that Germany had acknowledged the 
right of Allied powers to try and punish "war criminals. 1114 However, 
the most often referred to treaty by writers is the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact or the Treaty for the Rerumciation of War of 1928, which Germany 
15 
signed a year later. 'lhis treaty bound over sixty states from startin(; 
12 Oppenheim, Intemational Law, Vol. 1, p. 60. 
13Bemays, "Legal. Basis of the Nuremberg Trial.s," p. 9; Robert 
H, Jacksont 'lhe Niirnberg Case (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 
Inc., 1971), P. 15. 
14John Alan Appleman, Mili ta Tribunals and Intemational Crimes 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 19.54 , pp. 51-2; 1!fI, Vol. 1, .n~"· 
222-23; See also Bosch, Judgment on Nuremberg, p. 5; Phleger, "Nurer.ibE:rg--
A Fair Trial.?" p. 63 • 
15Silvergate, "Conspiracy IX>ctrine," p. 39; Jackson Nurnberg Casi:: r 
p. 15, cited by Jackson as evidence for aggression; see also Gerhart, 
America's Adocate, p. 344; Baird, From Nuremberg to MY Lai, p. 117; 
"During the preparation of my previous book on the _subject of war crimes, 
[War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment_; I was not at all 
certain that the acts of launching and conducting an aggressive war 
could be regarded as 'intemational. crimes.' I finally decided against 
such a view, largely on the basis of a strict interpretation of the 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War (BrianC:.-Kellogg Pact), signed iri 
Paris in 1928" in Sheldon Glueck, The Nurember Trial and £<ressive 
!!.£ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946 , pp, 4-5; Mr. Kellogg made the:;e 
remarks before the House Committee for Foreign Relations of the U .s. 
Senate in December, 1928: "But howthe:m can be a moral obligation for 
the Uni t(,>d States to go to Europe to punish the aggressor or punish 
the party making war •••• " Quoted by Maugham, U.N.O. and War Crimez, 
p, 68; Lavidson, The Nuremberg Fallacy, pp. 14-15; Appleman held the 
View that aggressive war is a crime, and referred to the Kellogg-Briant 
Pact in Appleman, Military Tribunals, pp. 26-7; Woetzel is sornewh~t 
ambiquously pro-Nuremberg in championing the p:,i.ct in hoetz<::J.., Nurembere; 
Trial§, pp. 143-49; Yet, Woetzel took a firm stc.nd ir; the end against 
it: "It is correct, therefore, that at 
an aggressive war. Could the Germa.ns use sdf-defense as a:1 a.rgi.r::cnt? 
16 They thought they could. Additionally, Oppenheim 1 ike 1-llrray Bernays 
pointed out that the fundamental answer for not basing outbreaks of 
aggression on the Pact was that the Pact fell apart because it pro-
vided no sanctions in case of violations.17 It the Pact had clearly 
defined "aggression" and laid out the punishments for it, then there 
would be no question as to its worth in international law. 
Oppenheim concluded in the following manneri 
'!he shortcomings of the Pact, from the point of view of its 
professed object, have already been noted in this chapter. 
'!hey are: the uncertainty as to how far the prohibition of 
resort to war includes measures of force short of war; 
the absence of any provision for authoritative ascertainment 
of breaches of the Pact; the failure to provide for col-
lective enforcement of its obligations, at least to 
the extent of a mitigation of the rigidity of the es-
tablished rules of neutrol.i ty to the disadvantage of the 
the outbreak of the Second World War, the question whether indivlduaJ 
liability attached to a violation of the provisions of the Kellogg Pact 
remained fundamentally unanswered. The terms 'aggression' and 'S.nter-
nations crime' were also left undefined. The Pact was a document 
latent with meaning; but without interpretation by an authoritative 
source," in Ibid., p. 1.53; Henry L. Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial: 
Landmark in Law," Foreign Affairs 2.5 (January 1947): 182-83, 
without a doubt is pro-Nuremberg; Bernays, "Legal Ba.sis of the 
Nuremberg Trials," p. 9, stating that aggression was "illegal but 
not criminal" which indeed is the heart of the matter; Finch, "The 
Nuremberg '!'rial and International Law," pp. 26, J3, (Pro-Nuremberg); 
Brierly, The Law of Nations, pp • .54, 408-11; Benton and Grimm, eds., 
German Views of the Trials, p. 11; Oppenheim discussed the Pact in 
depth in Oppenheim, International Law: A 'l'reatise, ?th ed, , ed.i ted by 
H. Lauterpacht, Vol. 2: Disputes, War, and Neutrality {New York: 
David Mckay, Co., 196.5), pp. 177-97; The Treaty bound over sixty 
states from starting an aggressive war, in Oppenheim, International 
~' Vol, 2, p. 188. 
16Ibid, 
1? Ibid. , pp. 190-91 ; Bernays, "Legal Basis of the Ifore.11 berg 
Trials," p, 9; Benton and Grlnun, eds., German Views of the Trials, p. 15. 
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law-breaker; and the absence of a duty expressly laid 
do~m in the Pact to submit disputes between its signatories 
to impair the political significa..•1cE; cnd thP "Prospects of 
observance of the Pact. But in law the terms of the 
Pact are very comprehensive, and the danger of the pur-
pose of the' Pact being frustrated lies not in the nonnal 
operation of its provisions, but in the possibility of 
their violation by the signatories.18 
Thus, one can distinctly see that a big problem thwarted the 
move for action against the German leaders. According to Platonic 
logic, according to Henry Stimson, the Allies could have: (1) turned 
the Gennan leaders lose., (2) given them back to Genna.ny, or (3) tried 
them in an international court according to the best standards of the 
law •19 The Allies chose the latter method of operation, dismissing 
the fourth possibility of trial also by neutrals. On 8 August 1945 
representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, 
and the USSR signed in London a short Agreement of seven articles 
which created the International Military Tribunal, giving it tems 
of reference. This London .Agreement referred back to an earlier 
meeting, the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943 in which Churchill, 
Roosevelt, and Stalin had announced to the world that German officers 
and men and members of the Nazi Party, who had been responsible for 
or had consented. to atrocites and crimes in occupied countries, would 
be sent back to the scenes of their crimes for punishment by the govern-
ments of those countries in accordance with their laws, and that (fol-
lowing the provisions of Article 229 of the Treaty of Versailles) 
18 Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 2, p. 196. 
19Stimson, "The Nuremberg Trial," p. 179; see also Baird, 
From N~~".mberg to My !:.ai, pp. 114-15. 
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"major war cri.'ninals whose offenses had no particular geographical 
location" would be ptmished by the joint decision of the Allies. 
The London Agreement established seven articles in light of 
the United Nations declarations and the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 
1943 that "war criminals shall be brought to justice. 1120 The first 
article created an "International Mili ta.r,y Tribtmal for the trial of 
21 
war criminals whose offenses had no particular geographical location." 
Not only were the chief Ge:rman leaders to be held responsible, but 
the members in the Nazi government organization were to be held equally 
accountable. The second article set up the constitution, jurisdiction, 
and fUnctions of the Tribunal established in the Charter. Thirdly, 
each signatory had to take the necessary steps required for the in-
vestigation and the trial of "major war criminals." Cl.early stated in 
the fourth article was the agreement that nothing should prejudice 
the provisions established in the Moscow Declaration concerning the 
return of war criminaJ.s to the countries where they committed. their 
crimes. The fifth article states that "any Government of the United 
Nations may adhere to this Agreement by notice given through the di~lo-
ma tic channel to the Government of the United Kingdom, who shall infonr. 
the other signatory and adhering Government of each such adherence." 
FUrthe:rmore, there were to be no prejudices to enter this trial as 
Article Six stated. Article Seven executed. this .Agreement into law 
22 the 8 August 1945. 
20 IM'£, Vol • 1 , p. 8. 
21 See Appendix c. 
22 IMT 1 Vol. 1, PP• 8-9. 
The Charter23 of the International Military Tribtma.l included 
the Constitution, jurisdiction, and general principles. Thus, th€ rul c!:,. 
were laid down providing that the competence of the Tribunal could be 
challenged neither by the prosecution nor by the defense, that its 
decisions would be made by a majority vote1 the deciding vote in the 
event of a tie was to be cast by the President of the Court, Lord 
24 Justice Geoffrey Lawrence of Great Britain, There were three crimes 
that became the basis for the four counts; namely, a common plan or 
conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
charged against the "chief Nazi leaders" in their indictments,25 
There were five other parts in the Charter that established 
a "Committee for the Investigation and Prosecution of Major War Criminals," 
also including a fair trial for defendants, the powers of the Tribunal, 
and the conduct of the Tri.al, judgment and sentence, and expenses.26 
The United States was the creator of the conspiracy count az 
well as its leading promoter of the triale27 Before the clause on 
aggressive warfare had been adopted, some argumentation developed over 
28 the phrasing, Robert Houghwout Jackson, who had been a lawyer, a 
2'.3eonsult Appendix D, 
24IMT, Vol. 1, pp. 8-9. 
25IMT, Vol. 1, p. 11; New York Times, 9 October 1945, sec, 2, ~· 
26IMT, Vol, 1, pp, 1J-16. 
27 Sil vergate, "Conspiracy IX>ctrine," p. 2; Conspiracy was related 
to all four counts in the indictment, and therefore, the heart of the 
case. (See NCA, Vol, 1, p. '.370; Il1T, Vol. 2, p. 241.) Conspiracy and 
aggression are described in detail by the Il1T in NC.-1, Vol. 1, pp. 114-;:: 
28Iavidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 10. 
2J 
Solicitor General, and Attorney General, and at the time that Truman 
appointed him to the Tribunal, au. s. Supreme Court Justice,29 stated: 
What we are trying to do is to depart from ours and find a 
system which, while it follows the general. philosophy of 
our system is one on which we can hope to try these cases 0 
in a reasonable length of time and without undue difficulty .3 
Jackson believed that the Briand-Kellogg Pact supported his views on 
a.ggression.31 The Americans had approximately 200,000 war prisoners, 
but they wanted to avoid a separate trial for each. Thus, they insisted 
upon the conspiracy plan.32 
Therefore, the United States handled col.mt one; the British, 
count two; the French, col.mt three; and the Russians, count four.33 
'!he Chief Prosecutors of the four Allied countries weres Justice 
Robert H. Jackson of the U.S.; H. M. Attorney-General, Sir Hartley 
Shawcross of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; 
General R. A. Rudenko of the USSR; and M. Francois de Menthon and M. 
Auguste Champetier de Ribes of the French Republic.34 Each prosecutor 
of his respective country had a retinue of associates. The judges 
composed a team of four plus their aJ. ternatives: Sir Geoffrey Lawrence 
of Britain (President of the Tribunal) and his alternative, Sir Williari 
29 . Gerhart, America's Advocate, p. JOB. 
JOQuoting Iavidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 12 in Gerhart, 
America's Advocate, p. )26. 
31Gerhart, America's Advocate, p. 344. 
32Ibid,, p. )JO; See also Silvergate, "Conspiracy Doctrine," 
pP. 25, 72, 105; Robert H. Jackson, 'Ihe Case Against the Nazi War 
Criminals, Preface by Gordon Dean (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), 
. p. Vii; IMT, Vol. 1, p. 30. 
33Gerha.rt, America's AE.yQcate, p. )62. 
34rMT, Vol. 1, pp. 3-5. 
Birkett; Mr. Francis Biddle of the U.S. and Judge john J. Parker; 1'1. 
Le Professeur IOnnedieu de Vabres of France and M. Le Conseiller R. 
Falco; and Major General I, T, Niki tcheneko of the USSR with Lieutenant 
Colonel A. F. Volchkov,35 
35 ( IMT, Vol. 1, p. 1. Note that the Russians wore their 
mili tarJ insignia at the Trials,) 
CHAPTER III 
INDICTMENTS AND SENTENCES OF TWENTY-FOUR NAZI LEADERS 
AND SIX NAZI ORGANIZATIONS 
'Ihe F\J.nrer, Adolf Hitler, had committed suicide in his Bunker 
in Berlin ten hours before the Allies reached him. Joseph Paul Gob-
bels, the Propaganda Minister, had also committed suicide along with 
his family, taking potassium cyanide capsules. Likewise 1 Henrich 
Himmler, the leader of the SS, took his own life by cracking a 
1 potassium cyanide crystal during an examination by a British doctor. 
'Ihere remained twenty-four other chief Nazi government officials alive 
and six Nazi organizations indicted on various crimes. 
Among the other twenty-two defendants besides Sauckel a.nd 
Speer, there were: Hermann Wilhelm Goring, the Number-Two Man in the 
Nazi govemment, Trustee of the Fbur-Year Plan, Reich Minister for 
Air, and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Fbrce; Rudolf Hess, deputy 
to the Fiihrer, successor designate next to Hitler, a.nd a member of the 
Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich; Joachim von Rib~ntrop, 
Ambassador to Great Britain, and Minister for Foreign Affairs; Robert 
Ley, Leader of the Labour Front (who hanged himself before the Trials 
started on 25 October 1945); 2 Wilhelm Keitel, Head of the OKW (High 
1 Hamsher, Albert Speer, p. 177. 
2 Appleman, Military Tribunals, p. 6; Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, 
:p. 2. 
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Command of the Anned Fbrces), member of the Ministerial Council for 
the Defense of the Reich, and a Rl.eld-Marshall; Ernst Kaltenbrunner, 
Chief of the SS in Austria., State Secretary for Security in Austria, 
Chief of the (Gennan) Security Police, and Security Service (SD), and 
Head of the RSHA in the Ministry of the Interior and SS; Alfred Rosen-
berg, Head of the Foreign Department of the Nazi Party, Reichsleiter 
for Ideology, Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories, Fili.tor 
of the Volkischer Boobachter, and Head of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg; 
Hans Frank, Minister without Portfolio, Reichslei ter for Legal Affairs, 
and Governor of Pola.nds Wilhelm Frick, Minister of t.he Interior, Pleni-
potentiary for Home .Administration, Member of the Ministerial Council 
for the Defense of the Reich, a.nd Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.; 
Julius Streicher, Ga.uleiter of ,Franconia and Eliitor of Der Stunner; 
Walter F\J.nk, Government Press Chief, State Secretary in the Propaganda 
Ministry, Minister for Economics, Plenipotentiary for War E.conomy, 
President of the Reichsbank, Member of the Ministerial Council for thr::: 
Defense of the Reich; Hjalmar Schacht, Minister for Economics, Pleni-
for War Economy, President of the Reichsba.nd, Minister without Portfolio; 
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Chainna.n of Krupp A.G.; Karl rbni tz, 
Commander-in-Chief of U-boats, Commander-in-Chief of the Gcrr.ian liav;;, 
Grossadmiral, Head of the Ge:rma.n State after Hitler's death; Erich 
Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the Gennan Navy and Grossad.T11iral; Badur 
von Schirach, Youth Leader, and Governor a.nd Gauleiter of Vienna; Alfred 
Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW, Generaloberst; Martin 
Bonna.nn, Deputy to the Ftihrer, and Head of the Cha.ncellory of the Nazi 
Party; Jiranz von Papen, Vice-Chancellor of the Reich, Ambassador to 
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Austria, and Ambassador to Turkey; Artur Seyss-Inquart, Minister of 
the Interior and Chancellor of Austria, Commissioner for the Nether-
lands, Minister without Portfolio; Constantin von Neurath, Minister 
without Portfolo; Hans Fritzsche, Chief of Radio Propa.ga.nd.a, &litor 
of DNB, and Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of Radio 
in Greater Ge111ta.ny.3 
'lhe Tribllllal indicted GOring on all four counts; na'lllely, a 
common plan or conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity; convicted on all of them, and sentenced to death by 
hanging. Hess was indicted on al.l four counts, convicted on the first 
two, and sentenced to life imprisonment in Spa.ndau prison, remaining 
there to this day even though the Allies, excluding Russia, have 
pressed for his release a number of' times. He is a man over eighty 
years of age. Ribbentrop was also indicted on all four counts and 
convicted of them; hence, death by hanging. Keitel was indicted 
and convicted on all four collllts--death by hanging. Kaltenbrunner 
was convicted on the last two even though he was also charged with 
the first one. He was sentenced to be hanged. Rosenberg received the 
same indictment, verdict, and sentence as Keitel, Jod.1 1 and Rosenberg. 
Frank received the same indictment, verdict, and sentence as Kaltenbrunner. 
F.rich was also sentenced to death after being indicted on all four 
collllts and convicted of the last three, but Funk, for the last listed 
items, was sentenced to life imprisonment. 'lhe final decision of the 
Tribllllal regarding Streicher was: charged on Counts One and Fbur; 
3 IMT, Vol. 1, pp, 68-79. 
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4 
convicted on Count Four; verdict--dea.th by hanging. 
'Ihe Chairman of the Krupp Works, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen, 
suffering from senility, was seventy-eight years old at the time of the 
Trial. Because he was unable to appear in court, his son Alfried, 
whom the court felt was as equally responsible, was tried by a later 
American court, found guilty of divers crimes, including forced labor, 
and sentences to twelve years imprisonment.5 However, he only served 
for seven years, and his confiscated property was restored. 
'Ihe Minister for Economics, Schacht, along with Fritzsche 
and von Papen were acquitted, not being found guilty on any of the 
four charges. Raeder and Funk along with Hess were sentenced to life 
imprisonment, but the former two later died with Hess being the only 
survivor. Neurath and OOnitz received a verdict of fifteen and ten 
years imprisonment respectively. Schira.ch was sentenced to twenty 
yea.rs imprisonment. Bormann was sentenced to death after being tried. 
in absentia, but never to this day has he been found. Presumably, he 
died during the la.st days of the war. Of the twenty-two listed, in-
eluding Sauckel and Speer and excluding Ley and Krupp, twelve were 
sentenced to death by handing, three to twenty years imprisonment, one 
to fifteen yea.rs, one to ten yea.rs, and three, a.dquitted.6 However, 
the Russians felt that the three acquitted should have been convicted, 
4Ibid.' pp. 279-341 •. 
5Ibid., p. 145. 
6 . 
Ibid., pp. 364-7; Calvocoressi, !'l!!I'Cmberg, p. 141; Bormann 
was offic.ially declared dead in 1954 by a Gem.an court at Eerch-
tesgaden; he most probably was killed on 1 l'iay 1945. (See Woetzel, 
Nuremberg Trials, p. 2.) 
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and they disagreed over the Tribunal's judgment of Hess. In their 
"Dissenting Opinion" after the final verdicts, the Soviet Member 
disagreed that the Reichscabinet, General Staff, and the OKW should 
be declared ir.noccnt.7 
The prosecution staff asked the Tribunal to declare it a crime 
for an individual to have belonged to the chief Nazi organizations. 
'Ihe major Nazi organizations indicted were: (1) Reicbskabinett; 
(2) Leadership Corps of the Party; (J) SS and SD (including the 
Cr.tminal Police, the Security Police, and the RSHA); (4) SA; 
(5) Gestapo; and (6) General Staff and High Command. The Tribunal 
declared the SS and the SD, the Gestapo, and the Leadership Corps 
of the Nazi Party criminal organizations. However, it acquitted the 
Reich Cabinet, the SA, and the General Staff and High Command of the 
8 German Armed Fbrces. 
'Ihe Trials opened on 20 November 1945, Each of the twenty-two 
defendants was arraigned and pleaded not guilty9 as each stepped up to 
a microphone set in front of the dock, From that day until the '.31 
August 1946, the Tribunal sat five to five and a half days each week 
except for short recesses over the usual holiday periods. Judgment was 
delivered on '.30 September and 1 October 1946. In addition to the 
documentary infonnation presented as evidence, 116 witnesses gave oral 
evidence, thirty-three for the prosecution and eighty-three (including 
7IMT, Vol. 1, pp. )42-64. 
8 Ibid,, pp. 171-279. 
9 Ibid. t p. 94. 
JO 
nineteen of the accused) for the defense. 'l'he Trial was conducted in 
four different languages simultaneously without the necessity for 
breaks for translation, Each lawyer or witness spoke in his native 
language into a microphone, What he said was made audible to every 
person in the court room, judges, accused, lawyers, press and visitors, 
over a wired headphone system which they could plug in any of the four 
language circuits, .ENery seat in the court had a pair of headphones 
attached to it. Among those listening to the speaker were a group 
of interpreters, who, as the words ca.me to them in their headphones, 
repeated them in other languages into microphones. A staff of trans-
lators made the words available to everyone in return, 'Ihe IBM system 
worked remarkably well, Brf',a.kdowns were few and the saving of time 
10 
was immense, 
1 O Cal. vocoressi , Nuremberg, pp • 10-11 • 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LABOR RECRUITER AND ALLOCATOR--
FRITZ SAUCKEL 
The Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, Fritz Sauckel, was 
indicted on all four counts. His indictment read as follows: 
The Defendant SAUCKEL between 1921 and 1945 was: A 
member of the Nazi Party, Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter 
of Thuringia, a member of the Reichstag, General Pleni-
potentiary for the Employment of Labor under the Four 
Year Plan, Joint Organizer with the Defendant Ley of the 
Central Inspection for the Care of Foreign Workers, a 
General in the SS and a General in the SA. The Defendant 
SAUCKEL used the foregoing positions and his personal 
inf1.uence in such a manner that: He promoted. the accession 
to power of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One 
of the Indictment; he participated in the economic pre-
parations for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation 
of Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set forth in 
Coi.mt.s One and Two of the Indictment; he authorized, dir-
ected, and participated. in the War Crimes set forth 
in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against 
Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, 
including particularly t~e War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity involved in forcing the inhabitants of occupied 
countries to wofk as slave laborers in occupied countries 
and in Germany. 
2 Sauckel pleaded not guilty to the indictment. The Tribunal 
constantly ·.nterrogated him as well as the other defendants before 
the sta.rt of the Trials. 
Sauckel was sworn in on Tuesday, 28 May 1946, the onE:-hundn<d th-
1IMT, Vol. 1, p. 7.3; NCA, Vol. 1, pp. 61-62; New York Time~, 
19 October 1945, sec. 10, p.""'i: 
? 
"]}iT, Vol. 1, p. 94, Vol. 2, p. 98. 
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and-fortieth day of the Trials. He took the stand ) June 1946,J He 
stated that he was the only ch!.ld of the postman, Friederick Sauck!:·l, 
born at Hassfurt on the Ilain near Bamberg on 27 October 1894.4 He 
attended the elementary school at Schweinfurt and also the secondary 
school. His mother was a seamstress; his father, a postman,5 
Sauckel worked on Norwegian and Swedish sailing ships at the 
age of fifteen. During the first World War, the French captured 
Sauckel on a Gennan sailing vessel on the way to Australia. He remained 
a prisoner for five years. Then, Sa.uckel studied engineering for two 
6 years. 
In 1923 after having already been in sympathy for sometime with 
the party, he joined it.7 Later he became Gauleiter in Thuringia.8 
One of SauckP.l' s first confessions was that "I myself was n"'vAr as SA 
man, I was an honorary Oberguppenfilhrer in the Sli ... 9 He was a mer-.b"" r 
of the Reichstag from 1933 until the end of the war. 10 
On 21 I'iarch 1942 through a decree signed by Hitler, Lammers, 
J Ibid., Vol, 14, pp. 602 et seq.,--Vol. 15, pp. 1-283. 
4Ibid., Vol. 14, p. 602; Davidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 505. 
r.'. 
JIHT, Vol 14, p. 60); Lavidson, Trial of the Gennans, p. 505. 
6rHT, Vol. 14, 60). 
7 Ibid., p. 604. 
8Ibid. , p. 606; 10.vidson, Trial of the Gerr:aY1s, p. 501~. .-i 
Gauld ter was the term the Nazis used :for the poli :.ical lE:c.d~~r of 
a district or Fau, 
9 ' Il,T, Vol. 14, 608. 
l O Ibid. , p. 609 , 
)) 
and Keitel, Sauckel was appointed to the position of Plenipotentiary 
General for the Allocation of Labor, 11 Sauckel asserted that he did 
not know the reason for being chosen. He supposed the reason consisted 
12 
of his knowledge of engineering and of his former occupation. Robert 
Serva ti us, his defense-counsel, asked whether Speer had suggested his 
appointment. Sauckel replied that "Reichsleiter Bormann stated that 
[Speer suggested that Sauckel be appointed Labor Allocator J in the 
preamble to his official. decree. 
1-
I do not know the actual circumstances." j 
Nevertheless, the decree of the 21 March 19l.j.2 authorized Sauckel "to 
carry out the moblization of Geman and foreign workers, including pri-
soners of war in the Reich and in all the territories occupied. by 
Germany, within the framework of the Fbur Year Plan. 1114 
Before the start of the war, the Supreme Command of the German 
Anned Fbrces had made plans to use forced labor including not only 
prisoners-of-war, but also civilians in the occupied. countries. 15 
Thousands of Dutch, Polish, and French workers had already gone to the 
Reich before Sauckel took office. Therefore, Sauckel did not initiate 
11 Ibid., p. 618; Davidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 5o4; NCA 
Vol, 1, p. 909. 
12 IMT, Vol. 14, p. 618, 
13Ibid., pp. 618-19; Davidson pointed out that Speer suggested. 
Sauckel's appointment. (See Davidson, Trial of the Gennans, p. 25.) 
14Il1T, Vol 1, p. 4,54, (1666-PS); NCA, Vol. 1, p. 909. 
1
.5rn'f, Vol. 5, p. 391; Throughout his book, Ek3.ward L. Homze 
indicates that the reason for employing foreign labor was ti".e shortage 
of labor at home for production toward the war effort. (See lliward 
L. Honze, Forei Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 19>7. 
JL~ 
such actions. 
Sauckel testified that his chief sphere of worl: was in 
directing and regulating Geman labor. He replaced eligible German 
draftees and other Gennans with suitably skilled workers. He admitted 
obtaining new labor for the new war industries which had been set up 
16 for food production as well as for the production of armaments. '!hen, 
Sauckel described the types of workers: 
First there were the workers who were already present in 
The Reich from all sorts of caJ.lings who, as I have said, 
had not yet be,:m directed to war ecomony, not yet com-
pletely incorporated in the way that was necessary for the 
conduct of the war. '!hen fUrther there were the pri-
soners of war as far as their labor was made available 
by the anny authorities.17 
In answer to another question, Sauckel replied& 
Hundreds of thousands of Gennan soldiers had suffered 
terribly from the cold; many divisions had lost their 
anns and supplies. The Fiihrer explained to me that if 
the race with the enemy for new anns, new munitions, 
and new dispositions of forces was not won now, the 
Soviets would be as far as the Channel by the next 
winter. Appealing to my sense of duty and asking me to 
put into it all I could, he gave me the task of obtaining 
new foreign labor for employment in the German war 
economy.18 
Sauckel, when asked by Servatius whether he had any scruples that 
this was against international. law, replied that the FUhrer had spoken 
to him about this question in much detail. 'Ihe Ftihrer convinced him 
1E IMT, Vol. 14, p. 620. 
17Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 622. 
J.5 
to have no misgivings concerning the matter. 19 He also said that he 
knew the stipulations regarding the treatment and protection of prisoners-
20 
of-war according to the Hague land warfare regulations. Moreover, he 
felt justified by his conduct and actions. Furthennore, Sa.uckel 
emphasized: 
At all times a regime of no matter what nature, can only be 
successful in the production of goods if it uses labor 
economically--not too much and not too little. That alone 
I consider economically justifiable.21 
In issuing directives and orders of a departmental nature, 
Sauckel could only do so directly to those offices, such as the 
22 
"Employment of Labor" and "Wages". Only through the Foreign Office 
or by expressed permission from Hitler and the ambassadors or 
ministers could Sauckel carry on negotiations with foreign countries.2J 
Sauckel made every effort to enforce his own directives without required 
24 
consent from anyone else. 
Sauckel admitted using "shanghaiing" methods as a means of 
19Ibid.; See also Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 205; "Sauckel never for 
a moment thought of his assignment as conf1icting with international 
law. • • He had been told by Hitler he said virtuously at Nuremberg, that 
the use of foreign labor was not contrary to the Hague Convention; but 
in an event the Fuehrer had explained, since Russia was not a signatory 
to the P.a.gue treaty, its provisions would not apply to Soviet citizens." 
(See Davidson, Trial of the Gennans, p • .508.) 
20 1!:!£, Vol. 14, p. 62J. 
21 Ibid. f p. 625. 
22Ibid., pp. 626-7. 
2Jibid., p. 627. 
-
24Ibid •• p. 631. 
25 
recruiting labor.· He stated that "the actual recruitment of foreign 
workf~rs was thf::! ta::k of the German offices established in the various 
regions, the offices of military commanders or similar civilian German 
institutions. 1126 Sauckel related that several million foreign workers 
came to Germany willingly, "as voluntary recruitment was the underlying 
principle. 1127 Concerning compulsory methods, Sauckel set forth his 
policy: 
All these measures [burning down of villages and the shooting 
of merl] are clearly in contradiction to the directives and 
instructions which I issued and which have been submitted 
here in large numbers, and to these I must refer. These are 
methods against which, I heardasmuch as hints of them, I 
took very sever€ measures.28 
At the 1 :March 1944 meeting of the Central Planning Board, 
Sa.uckel stated, however, that 
Out of the 5 million foreign workers who arrived in Gennany, 
not ev€?l 200,000 ca.me voluntarily.29 
Sauckel stated that transportation of workers should be carried 
out in an "unobjectionable manner" with plenty of food and no over-
crowding in his fourth directive.JO Sauckel stated that the general 
living conditions of foreign workers after they had arrived in Gennany 
Z.5Ibid., Vol. 15, p. 4. 
26Ib.d 
l. • ' p. 5. 
27Ibid.' pp. 6, 216. 
28Ib'd 10 l. • ' p. • 
29 Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 110; NCA, Vol. 1, p. 895, Vol. 8, pp. 146, 
160. Alan S, Milward speaks of recruitment in Nazi Germany by means 
of force and compulsion in Ala.Tl S. Milward, 'lhf! New Order a.'1d the 
French :''.£2..nOw:J. ( Oxfo::rd: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 116. 
JOIMT, Vol. 15, p, 18. 
J? 
were identical with those of German workers who were accommodated in 
camps. 0 Living conditions were dependent on the circumstances of war, 
and in contrast with peacetime, were subject to the same limitations 
as applied to the Gennan population. ,Jl Herr von Schirach testified 
for Sauckel on this matter. 
Sauckel personally issued orders concerning the camps, but 
The camp leader the Reich Minister of Labor could put them into effect. 
and the DAF (Gennan Labor Front) supervised the camps.32 The Army was 
responsible for prisoner-of-war camps.33 The Reichsfiiher SS established 
the labor correction camps.34 It was also the task of the Reichs-
fiihrer SS to employ Jews as Sauckel stated.35 Yet later on in his 
testimony, Sauckel admitted employing prisoners-of-war.36 
The total number of foreign workers utilized were five million.37 
The employers of labor included the Economic Ministry, the Armament 
Ministry, the Agricultural Ministry, the various trades , the State 
Railways, and the mines.38 Hitler was the chief, under hi~ was Spe8r, 
31Ibid.' p. 23. 
J2Ib1d.' p. 25. 
))Ibid.' p. 36. 
34Ib.d l. •• p. 39; See also Ibid., pp. 179, 198-99. 
J5Ibid.' p. 42; See also Ibid., p. 172. 
36Ibid.' p. 115. 
J?Ibid., p. 52. 
38 Ibid.' p. 53. 
38 
and then Sa.uckel.39 Sauckel stated that his office had to meet the 
40 demands ma.de by Speer, Again, he reiterated that he felt justified 
for his role in the Nazi rcgime,41 
Upon cross-examination, Sauckel disagreed with the theory of 
Le bensratun when 1 t referred to wars of aggression. He ref'Used to 
42 
emphasize the idea of the master race. Concerning the amount of 
force exercised by Hitler over him and thus, his obedience to superior 
authority, the Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic, Jacques 
B, Herzog asked: 
I will read it once more: ",,,I agree with all the decisions 
taken by Hitler and the NSDAP concerning the means to be used 
and the measures to be taken to obtain these ends, and I 
collaborated, actively in the execution of this plan," I 
ask you to confirm whether you made these statements, 
To this Saucker replied& 
I certainly would not have made those statements in the way I 
did, if I had been able to act freely and according to my 
own will,43 
44 Sauckel acknowledged that he followed Hitler's orders. 
'!hen, Sauckel asserted that Speer agreed or demanded that 
workers should be put at his disposal, He admitted that they did not 
39speer admitted this in his trial.. (See IMT, Vol. 16, p, 
479.) Milward pointed out that ultimate responsibility rested with 
the Fiihrer in Mil ward, The New Order, p • 1 ?6 • 
40 IMT, Vol, 15, p. ,54. 
41
'Ibid.' p, 55, 
42Ibid.' p. 62. 
43Ibid.' p. 66. 
44 Ibid. ' p. 82 • 
agree on everything such as the protected factories in France.45 
When Sauckel was not successful in satisfying demands for workers, 
46 
"Speer'z orders took priority." 
M • Jacques B. Herzog questioned Sauckel again. He asked him 
whether he thougtt that it was a correct procedure to hand over foreign 
workers to the Gestapo and to concentration camps. Sauckel believed 
that serious offenses such as continued lack of worker responsibility 
warranted this action.47 Sauckel explained that, "with a good con-
science, I gained knowledge here of the cruelities which were com-
mitted in the concentration camps."48 However, the Prosec:..ition brought 
forward a picture of Sauckel in Buchenwald which he could not recali.49 
The Russian prosecutor, Alexandrow, appeared vezy firm in his 
questioning of Sauckel.50 The President ordered Alexandrow not to 
argue with him. 5l Then, Sauckel proceeded to answer the prosecutor, 
saying that, if he knew his actions were a crime, he would never have 
exercised those responsibilities.52 Again, Sauckel contradicted him-
self and stated that he "did not employ prisoners-of-war ... 53 Similar 
45Ibid., p. 112. 
46Ibid. 
47Ibid.' p. 120. 
48 121. Ibid., p. 
49Ibid., p. 122. 
50ibid., p. 143. 
5i!bid.' p • 145. 
.52Ib·d l. • ' p. 150. 
<:J 
j Cf. !MT, Vol. 15, p. 115 and p. 1_54. 
to Speer but not quite as believable, Sauckel throughout his trial said 
that he wanted to remain faithfUl to the Gf,rman people and their welfare. 
Sauckel asserted that he did not bear the responsibility of 
looking after the workers. His job consisted of "getting workers for 
the industries.".54 The police, military, and civilian operations 
recruited workers as S~uckel testified--55 a statement which contra-
dieted the task under his very title. 
Several witnesses ali;:.o testified. Max Timm, who worked in the 
Reich Labor Ministry in the Allocation of Labor department, and head 
of the European Office, stated that Sauckel handled administrative 
matters in an orderly fashion, being known for his friendliness to 
ci.vil servants. 56 Timm ad.mi tted that Speer was Sauckel' s superior. 57 
Another witness, Hubert Hildebrandt, who was serving in the Reich 
Viinistry of Labor from 1930 onward, dealt with questions of labor 
for the iron and metal industries, the chemical and textile industries. 
After 1940, Hildebrandt dealt with questions concerning workf~rs in the 
West • .58 He acknowledged that compulsory labor was used..59 Jager, 
a doctor entrusted with the medical care of the camps of foreign workers 
and employed for Krupp in Essen, stated that "the workers' clothing was 
.54Ibid.' p. 199, 
55Ibid.' p. 20?. 
56Ibid.' p. 208. 
5?Ibid.' p • 223. 
.58 Ibid.' p. 232. 
59lbid. 
60 61 poor," Several other witnesses did not show. With that note, 
Sauckel's trial ca.me to a close. 
In perspective it is evident that Sauckel took his assignment 
for granted as an honor bestowed upon him, seemingly without scruples 
of any grave consequences. However, recruiting labor appeared like a 
difficult undertaking to him, He announced his program in a memorandum 
on 20 April 1942: 
All these people must be fed, housed, and treated in 
such a way that With the least possible outlay the 
greatest possible results will be achieved.62 
'Ihe recruiting drive started out somewhat humane and worsened 
to a considerable degree because there was not enough habitable space 
available. "Sauckel either was unaware of much of what went on or 
ignored it. 1163 
Workers were paid a mark or two a week, but their pay varied 
from time to time owing to deductions. 'Ihe hours also varied but 
usually a thirteen-hour day was the custom. Workers could also be 
64 beaten for stealing a crumb of bread. Their production varied between 
sixty-five percent and one-hundred percent of that of the German workers. 65 
60 Ibid.' pp. 272-7.3. 
61 Ibid.' p. 28J. 
62 IMT, Vol. 25, p. 69, (016-PS); NCA, Vol. 1, p. 876; (See also 
Appendix A for more documentary evidence on Sauckel; Office of United 
States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi 
Conspiracy and Aggression, Supp. A. [Washington, D. c.: Government 
Prirrting Office, 1947. J ; and fil1!_, Vol. 8. ) Fbr the evidence on foreign 
labor in general, consult NCA, Vol. 1, pp. 875-948. 
63~vidson, Trial of the Germans, p. 507. 
64NCA, Vol. 7, pp. 1)-14, (D-J05). 
65IMT, Vol. 27, p. 594, (17.39-PS) 
4~). 
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Another harsh measure resulted in workers being exploited to the ut-
tennost for the benefit of the Reich. 66 Even eight-year-olds could 
be drafted when they seemed either dangerous or a nuisance to the 
Gennan occupa.nts. 67 A milder but well-planned measure for the benefit 
of maintaining the morale of the workers demanded that the undernourished 
receive medicine and food and good care for they "must be given the 
68 feeling it is to their own interest to work loyally for Gennany." 
Eugene Davidson stated that Sauckel organized "protection 
squad , " mixed groups of local police and his own employers, in order 
to get the workers in the West, His henchmen would sometimes sur-
round churches or moving-picture threaters, corralling hundreds of 
prisoners at one time. 69 Sauckel also made use of foreign workers for 
70 I. G. Farbfm. 
In the span of one year from April, 1942 until April, 1943, 
Sauckel rounded up J,6)8,056 workers of all descriptions for the 
"1 German economy with an additional 622 ,829 prisoners-of-war.' Towv,:rd 
the end of the war, labor has hard.er to get,, resulting in severer 
methods. 72 Another document revealed that the workers toiled in the 
66Ibid., Vol. 26, pp. 482-J, (410-EC), 
67Ibid., Vol. ), p. 448, (R-10J), 
68Ibid,, Vol, 14, p, 6J2. 
69navidson, Trial of the Gennans, p. 511. 
?Oibid. 
71 IMT _, Vol. J, p. 484; NCA, Vol. 1, p, 909, ( 407-VI-PS). 
72 IMT 
--· 
Vol. 15' pp. 264-8): Vol. 35, pp. 55-6, (D-258); 
Vol, 6, pp. 1111-12, (D-171). 
NGA 
clothes they came in, and even if they were sick, they were forced to 
work. 73 In contrast, a milder measure in the beginning of the war 
stated that "Ea.stem workers must be treated decently ....... 74 
Burton c. Andrus, the .P-iler at Nuremberg, stated that Sauckel 
was "a broken off, sharp-edged spoon."75 A prison psychologist, Kelly, 
found that Sauckel exhibited extremely energetic qual.i ties. He was 
emotionally stable but lacked the intelligence to realize the true 
problems of the situation. . Unlike Speer, he was intensely loyal to 
Hitler and felt no sense of guilt.76 The prison psychiatrist, G. N. 
Gilbert found that he had an I.Q. of 118; he also showed signs of 
anxiety and depression.77 Gilbert judged Sauckel as a "naive realist" 
with ''blind faith in Hitler."78 In Sauckel's cell, many times, Gilbert 
found him trembling and very defensive.79 
Fbr Sauckel's defense,80 Dr. Servatius pointed out the dif-
81 ficulty of defining slave labor. Servatius purported that: 
73Ibid., Vol.), pp. 90-99, (054-PS). 
74IMT. Vol. 41, ~P· 218-19, (Sauckel-16): See also l!f!'., 'lol. 41, 
pp. 228-40, (Sauckel-84). 
75i3urton C. Andrus, The Infamous of Nuremberg (London: Leslie 
Frewin, 1969), p. 126. 
76Ibid.' p. 172. 
77Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
78Ibid. 
79Gustave Mark Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar Straus & 
Co., 1947), pp. 75. 170-71. 
80IMT, Vol. 18, pp. 466-506; Office of United States Chief of 
Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi ConsPirac ' and A ression, 
Supp. B (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948 , pp. 699-740. 
81 IMT, Vol. 18, pp. 466-6?. 
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The significance of such a violation of the principles that 
armament production shall be forbidden lies in the serious 
consequence that no fonnation of a generaJ.ly recognized 
rule of international law in this new field of ultilization of 
manpower can thereby be proven. Under these circtUnstances 
therefore Gennany was likewise free to employ workers of the 
Soviet Union and workers of all other states in annament pro-
duction.82 
He continued in somewhat the same fashiona 
A purely mili tar,r emergency would provide no excuse for 
disregarding international law. Victory jeopardized must 
not be sought by breaking international law when in 
distress. because the laws of warfare are intended to govern 
that ver.r combat, which is of necessity connected with dis-
tress. International law inclines differently where it is 
a case of a measure to be taken to safeguard the existence 
of the state. That is a law of self-preservation which 
every state is entitled to because higher institutions 
are lacking which could protect it from destructions.BJ 
\ Dr. Servatius further ex.plained that foreign workers h3.d 
already been employed by individual action when Sauckel Kas appointed 
to his new office. Therefore, "he could take it for granted that the 
State would equally proceed in a legal manner. 1184 \Yet, Servatius 
argued that punishment could be inflicted only if Sauckel kr:.ew that 
his actions were catering to an unjust war. He pointed out that Sauckel 
denied such actions, and proof was not evident otherwise.85\ 
Then, Sauckel's defense counsel pointed out the diffErent 
86 sectors of responsibility. In conclusion, Servatius asserted: 
82Ibid.' p. 47). 
BJibid.' p. 476. 
84Ibid.' p. 477. 
s5Ibid.' p. 480. 
86Ibid.' p. 498. 
In any case one fact clearly speaks in favor of the 
Defendant Sauckel, one which has always been confirmed 
by competent witnesses, namely, that the workers were 
willing and industrious [yet, Sauckel himself admitted 
using forced la borers] and that when the collapse came 
no uprising occurred in which they would have given 
vent to their national wrath against the slaveholders. 
I have s\munarized actual happenings and appraised 
them juridically. All this, however, must appear to be 
juridical quibbling when a higher responsibility is 
involved. It has been stated here that it would not 
do to let the insignificant works managers take the blame, 
and that the moral responsibility must go to the highest 
Reich Government officesc On their own initiative they 
ought to have introduced corrections on a larger scale to 
cope with the difficulties inherent in the circumstances 
of that time.87 
Sauckel likewise pleaded in his own behalf. 88 He claimed that 
he, in spirit, was a simple sailor and worker. 89 His opening words 
in his own defense were: 
The atrocities revealed in this trial have shaken me in 
my deepest soul • In our humlli ty and reverence, I bow 
before the victims and those who died, members of all 
nations, and before the misery and the sorrow of my own 90 
people according to which I myself will make a statement. 
Therefore, he stated: 
It was never my intention to commit crimes against inter-
national law, against the laws of war, or against the 
laws of humanity. Not for a single moment did I doubt 
the legality and admissibility of my task, for I thought 
it completely out of the question that the German 
Government would break international law.91 
87 Ibid I t p • .504 O 
88 NCA, Supp. B, pp. 740-43. 
89Ibid •• p. 740. 
90Ibid. 
91 Ibid., p. 742. 
l.~6 
He believed that he had worked for good conditions,92 Sauckel 
concluded his final plea with the following words: 
God protect my beloved people, above all, and may the Lord 
bless the work of GP-nna.n workers, for whom I have lived 
and struggled, and may he give peace to the world.93 
Jackson stated that Sauckel was "the greatest and cruelest 
slaver since the Pharaohs of Egypt,"94 The Tribunal delivered its 
judgment upon Sauckel195 
The evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Sauckel 
was sufficiently connected with the common plan to wage 
aggressive war or sufficiently involved in the planning 
or waging of the aggressive wars to allow the Tribunal 
to convict him on Counts One or Two,96 
However, they quoted his attitude from a regulation: 
"All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way 
as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest 
conceivable degree of expenditure." The evidence shows that 
1 Sauckel was in charge of a program which involved deportation 
\ 
for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 human beings, m~ of 
them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering,9? 
The Tribunal thus found Sauckel guilty under Counts Three and Four, 
but dismissed the first two counts on grounds of insufficient evidence. 
\The Tribunal sentenced him to death by hanging,98 
92 Ibid., PP• 742-43. 
93 11. Ibid.' p. ? .... ). 
94Jackson, Numberg Case, p. 143; Gerhart, America's Advocate, 
pp. 417-18; IMT, Vol. 19, PP• 415-1?. 
95IMT, Vol. 22, pp. 566-68; Office of United States Chief of 
Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and 
A .. esslon inion and Ju ent {Washington, D, C: Government Prlnting 
Office, 194? , pp. 146-48. ·~ 
96 IMT, Vol. 22, p. 566. 
97 68 Ibid.' p. 5 • 
98NCA, Opinion and Judgment, p. 190; Il~T, Vol. 1, pp. )66-67, 
Vol. 2;:, p • .589. 
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The New York Times recorded the events as they happened, and 
their record appears to be quite congruent with the sources, The 
evidence against Sauckel and others was implied,99 The TimP.s reported 
that Sauckel was a visitor in Dachau. 100 The French prosecution in-
dicted Sauckel and the others for crimes against humanity, 101 Sauckel 
had violated international law by forcing conquered. people into the 
service of the conquerors, showing that the Gennans did not plan to 
102 free foreign labor from slavery after the war ended. 
When Sauckel took the stand, he admitted. voluntary labor re-
cruitment and then, shanghaiing of labor.103 The USSR prosecutor 
accused Sauckel of USSR forced labor recruitment; he also impliPd 
104 that he was a liaison for police terrorists. Three witnesses 
testified· that Sauckel and the labor administration were uninfonned. on 
10.5 abuses cornraitted against foreign workers. 
99New York Times, 13 Ikcember 194.5, sec, 
100Ibid.' 12 January 1946, sec. 1 • 2, p, 
101Ibid,' 20 January 1946, sec. ), p. 28. 
102Ibid., 19 January 1946, sec, ), p. 9. 
tOJibid., JO May 1946, sec. 2, p. 7, 
104Thid,' 1 June 1946, sec, 2, 8, p, .5. 
l0.5Ibid., 2 June 1946, sec, 2, p. 34. 
1' p, 12. 
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CHAJ'TER V 
'!HE HEAD OF WAR PRODUCTION AND ARMAMENTS--
ALBERT SPEER 
The man who put Sauckel • s foreign workers to use 1n the 
production and armaments industries in Genna.ny was indicted on all 
four counts like Sauckel and many of the other defendants: 
The defendant SPEER between 1932 and 1945 was: A member 
of the Reichstag, Reich Minister for Armament and Munitions, 
Chief of the Organization Todt, General Plenipotentiary 
for Armaments in the Office of the Four Year Plan, and 
Chainnan of the A.nnaments Council. The defendant SPEER 
used the foregoing :positions and his personal influence 
in such a manner that: He participated in the milita:cy 
and economic planning and pre:paration of the Nazi con-
spirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in Violation of 
International Treaties, Agreements, and Assurances set 
forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment; and he 
authorized, directed, and participated in the War Crimes 
set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and the Crimes 
ac;ainst Humanity set forth in Count Fbur of the Indictment, 
including more particularly the abuse and exploitation 
of human beings for forced labor in the conduct of aggres-
sive war.1 
2 Speer pleaded not guilty to the indictment. He went th.rough the 
similar procedures that the Tribunal subjected Sauckel and the other 
defendants to undergo. There was a motion of the prosecution for 
correcting discrepancies, an order of the Tribunal regarding notice 
to the defend.ants, and constant interrogation. 
Speer was born in Mannheim, Germany on 19 l>iarch 1905, the son 
1 IMT, Vol. 1, p, 73; NCA, Vol. 1, p. 6Z; New York Tir.es, 19 
October 1945, sec. 10, p. 1. 
2 !MT, Vol. 1, p. 98; roid., Vol. 2, p. 94. 
1.i-9 
and grandson of architects.3 As he testified, Speer took up architecture, 
more because of custom rathe!r than inclination. He was a first interested 
ln ma.thematics and physics. He attended the university at Munich and 
Berlin, where, when Hitler took power, he was the first assistant at 
the Technische Hochschule at the age of twenty-four. After his Abitur 
essay was judged the best in his class,4 Speer stated in his Memoirs 
that he was "above all an architect" and that his "political interests 
played a subsidiary pa.rt" in his thinking.5 In 1932 he went into 
business for himself until 1942. 6 
In 19.34 Hitler noticed Speer for the first time. Speer became 
acquainted with him and exercised his architectural functions with 
joy and enthusiasm. Besides building a new Reich Chancellery in 
Berlin and various buildings on the Party Rally grounds at Nuremberg, 
Sp€er replanned the cities of Berlin and Nuremberg. Hitler's megalomania 
forced him to sketch building plans which would have been among the 
largest in the world if put into operation, but time did not permit. 
However, he was unable to finish them because of the war. Speer re-
vealed that "if Hitler had had any friends at all, I certainly would 
have been one of his close friends." 7 
During his later twenties, Speer attracted Hitler's admiratlon 
--·--------
J Ibid., Vol. 16, p, 430; Iavidson, Trial of the Germans, pp. 485-
86; Hamsher, !!bert Spe~, pp. 6, 15, Memo~-pp. 3-4. 
4 Speer, Memoirs, p. 9; Hamsher, Albert Speer, p. 24. 
5 Speer, Memoirs, p. 21. 
6 IMT, Vol. 16, p. 430. 
7Tuid. 
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8 
as an architect and quite a congenial man. "I would have sold my 
soul like Faust. Now I had found my Mephistopheles. He seemed no 
less engaging than Goethe's."9 10 "Hitler's spell" had overwhelmed him. 
Speer described this situation more in relation to Hitler as if a 
mesmerizing hypnotism had taken hold of hims 
For five years I lived in this world of plans, and in 
spite of all their defects and absurdities I still can-
not entirely tear myself away from it all. When I look 
deep into myself for the reasons for my present hatred of 
Hitler, I sometimes think that in addition to all the 
terrible things he perpetrated I should perhaps include 
the personal disappointment his wanna.king brought to me; 
but I also realize that these plans could only have 
sprung from his unscrupulous game of power. Iesigns of 
such scale naturally indicate a kind of chronic meg-
alomania which is reason enough to dwell on these 
grandiose plans ••••• 11 
In another of the many instances, Speer characterized Hitler 
as containing "a multitud8 of selves, from a person deeply 
awa.re of his responsibilities all the way to a ruthless and man-
12 hating nihilist." 
The Tribunal called Speer to the stand on Wednesday, 19 June 
1946. His trial ended the 21 June 1946, the one-hundredth-and sixtirtr. 
8 Speer, Memoirs, p. 31. 
9Ibid.; See also "Hitlerand.His Architect," Times Literary 
Suppleme.nt 68 (October 16, 1969): 1173-74; J, Barkas, 'Face 
to Face with the Planner of the Third Reich," Contemporar:L Revie11 
222 (February 1973): 72-77. 
10 Speer, Memoirs, p. 49. 
11 ro1d., p. 1J8. 
12Ibid., p. 173; See also Hamsher, .@.bert Speer, p. 70. 
51 
day of the Tribunal in session. l3 Speer declared that he did not 
parti.cipate in the planning and preparation of an aggressive war. 
He was active as an architect until 1942. "The buildings which I 
constructed were completely representative of peacetime buildings, 014 
said Speer. Then, Speer described the incident which made him Minister 
of Annaments: 
On 8 February 1942, my predecessor, Dr. Todt, was killed in an 
an airplane crash. Several days later Hitler declared I was to 
be his successor in his many offices. At that time I was 36 
years of age, Up until that time, Hitler considered the main 
activity of Todt to be in the building sphere, and that is 
why he called me his successor, I believe that it was a complete 
surprise to everyone when I was called to office as a Minister, 
Immediately upon my assuming office, it could be 
seen that not builCling but the intensification of annaments 
was to be my main task, for the heavy losses of material 
in the battles in Russia during the winter of 1941-42 was 
a great blow. Hitler called for considerable intensification 
of annament productions,15 
Speer had the burden of building up an organization which Todt 
had somewhat neglected. First, Speer had to familiarize himself with 
a completely new field. Secondly, he had to create all organizational 
prerequisites for his task. Thirdly, responsibility lay with him for 
restoring the decreasing armament production for the Anny plus the 
responsibility for increasing production as much as possible within 
the next few months, Speer succeeded in doing that.16 
13 IMT, Vol. 16, pp. 429-591. 
14Thid. t p, 4J1. 
l 5Ibid. , p. 432; See also Speer, Memoirs, p. 193; Hamsher, 
Albert Speer, pp. 110-11; Davidson, Trial of the ~mans, p, 19; Homze, 
rbreir:n Labor, p. 87. 
16 IMT, Vol. 16, p. 432. 
Dr. Hans F.Ui.chsner, Speer's defense counsel, asked him to describe 
his tasks. Speer replied that his tasks included the surmounting of 
the inadequate supply of raw materials, metal~, and steel, the sys• 
tematizing of work by the introduction of assembly-line techniques, 
and the amplifying of the production programs for such things as fine 
steel, aluminum, and individual parts like ball bearings and gear wheels. 
One of his most important tasks was the development of new weapons 
and their serial production. Then, Speer had to repair the damages 
caused by the extraordinarily sudden bombing attacks, which forced him 
to work with improvised means and methods. l 7 One of his main tasks 
18 dealt with exercising state control over the distribution of orders. 
In 1942, when Speer took over the armaments and construction 
programs, he had 2.6 million workers. In the spring of 194.3, D:mitz 
entrusted hin with naval armament as well. 'Ih:rough an agreement with 
thf; I'.inister of Economy, Herr Funk, Speer controlled the production 
of the Ministry of Economy in September of 1943. As a result Speer 
now had 12 million workers. •' On 1 August 1944 Garing turned over the 
air armament production to Speer. 'Ihe total number of workers went 
up to 14 million, including foreign and German alike. These workers 
did not include those working in the occupied countries. 19 
Next, Speer listed the different divisions and responsibilities 
of each sector. The Food Ministry and the various offices connected 
17Ibid., p. 436. 
18Ib"d 1 • , p. 437. 
19Ibid. 
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with it were responsible for the food supply. The occupation-super-
vising agencies in the Reich Labor Ministry maintained the conditions 
in the Reich for the workers, The Trustees of Labor, worlting under 
the Plenipotentiary for Labor Commitment, were responsible for the 
salaries and the quality and quanity of work done. The Health Office 
of the Reich Ministry of the Interior tried to care for the heaJ.th of 
the workers by establishing set conditions. Furthermore, the Justice 
~partmcnt and the Police Department settled labor disputes and punished 
violations. FinaJ.ly, the Germ.an Labor Front represented the interests 
of labor with the employers,20 
Speer stated that Sauckel's task was finished with the re-
cruiting of workers for the industries. But he argued that the 
employment of workers in industry itself had to be a matter of manager 
concern and that this could not be influenced by the labor office. 
Yet, Speer testified that Sauckel was partly responsible for super-
21 
vising labor conditions. He continued to state that the works' 
managers found it impossible to carry through Sauckel' s decrees at 
times for reasons which were outside their power. Moreover, the 
bombing attacks brought about difficulties such as disorganizing trans-
portation or destroying living quarters especiaJ.ly in the summer of 1944. 
During these catastrophic times, the Reich authorities assl.Ulled the 
greater responsibility.22 
20Ibid.' p. 4J8'. 
21 Ibid, 
22Ibid., p. 4J9. 
When workers violated labor discipline, Speer considered it 
just that punishment should be handed out, but he did not demand 
supplementary measures, He believed that the workers would yield 
, , 23 
sufficient output if he kept on good terms with them. 
One of the directives that referred to Speer's humane conduct 
of affairs was Speer Directive Number 11. It df".Jllanded that "the 
Russians under all circumstances were to receive sufficient food 
and that civilian Russians were not to be put behind barbed wire and 
be treated as prisoners of war,"24 
Speer defended himself, when Dr. F1achsner asked whether he 
applied means of terror and brutality so that the achievements of the 
compulsory workers would be increased.25 He did not approve of increased 
productivity through very severe compulsory measures such as using 
SS and Police against recalcitrant workers. 26 
Even though Speer disagreed with Sauckel on matters, he thanked 
him for supplying laborers. 27 He was at odds with Sauckel in the 
middle of 1943 over production and the insufficient availability of 
ZJibid, 
24Ibid,, p, 440; See Appendix D for more documentary evidence 
on Speer. 
Z5IMT, Vol. 16, p. 446. 
26 Ibid.' pp. 446, 457. 
27Ibid., p. 447; See also Homze, Fbreign Labor, pp. 204-229; 
Testimony of Albert Speer, Industrial l-bbiliza.tion and Design an£ 
~welopment of Aircraft in Gennany (Washington, D. c.: Aircraft 
Industries Association, n. d.), pp. 30-31; Milward, New C.rci~.r, p, 179. 
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28 German labor reserves. But he stated in his Memoirs that he shared 
the responsibility for Sauckel' s "dire labor policies. 1129 He was 
al ways in basic agreP..ment with his mass deportations of foreign labor 
to Germany, Speer described the ineffectiveness of the Gennan ad-
ministration in thf:: occupied territories.JO "Thus, from the start 
of my work as Minister of Armaments, I discovered blunder after blunder, 
in all departments of the economy, 1131 One can see that Speer contin-
uously fought for better administrative methods, and his antagonism 
with Sauckel was part of this struggle. 
A very important part of Speer's trial dwelt on the concept 
of "armaments". Speer related1 
The concept of "annaments" was in no way restricted to that 
sphere which was outlined through the Geneva prisoner-of-war 
agreement, The modern concept of "armaments" is a much 
more comprehensive one, It includes a much wider sphere of 
activity. There were no basic principles set down for 
our concept of "armaments," The characteristic of an 
armament factory was that as an intermediary authority, 
the Annament Inspectorate took care of it and watched 
over it. In Germany, for instance, the entire production 
of raw steel belonged to armament; all rolling mills, foundries 
and forges, the production or the manufacture of aluminum and 
modern synthetic rubber; the production of synthetic wood; the 
manufacture of individual items, the use of which in armaments 
cannot be predicted at the time of their manufacture such as 
ball bearings gears, valves, engine pistons, and so forth, 
or the prod.uction of tool machinery, the setting up of 
assembly lines; similarly the manufacture of motor cars and 
the construction of locomotives, of merchant ships, and also 
textile factories, and factories manufacturing leather 
goods or wooden wares, 
28 IMT, Vol. 16, p, 447. 
29 Speer, Memoirs, p, 219. 
JOibid,, pp. 219-JO, 
)!Ibid,, p. 229; See also Homze, Foreign Labor, p, 2?6. 
I_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In the interrogatories, which I sent to my witnesses, 
I tried to have stated what percentages of the Geman annament 
industries produced armaments as defined by the Geneva Con-
vention, and I should like to give you the figures. My co-
workers agree unanimously that between 40 and 20 percent of 
our armament program was concerned with the production of 
weapons, armored cars, planes, warships, or the general equip-
ment which the various branches of the Armed Fbrces required. 
The bulk of the material, therefore, was not armament in the 
sense of the C'1€neva Convention. The reason for the expansion 
of the concept of "armament" in Germany was besides manu-
facturing reasons, the preferential treatment which applied 
to these industries, a trea. tment which resulted in munerous 
industries clamoring to be called anna.ment industries.32 
Speer said that the Krupp Works were an excellent example of a factory 
with a fraction of its production used for war equipment.33 Further-
more, Speer admitted knowing the Geneva regulations and believed that 
he did not go against them.34 However, he did not check the laws 
concerning recruited labor by force.35 
The fomer Minister of Amaments related the functions of the 
Organization 'l'odt which were exclusively technical ones. It had to 
carry out technical construction work; in the East, particularly road 
and rail construction, and the construction of concrete dugouts in 
the West. The Organization Todt used foreign labor to i.ts fullest.36 
It supplied its own technical staff and recruited its own workers by 
voluntary means. But Speer acknowledged that a certain percentagi:: 
of the workers operated under the conscription system.37 
32 IMT, Vol. 16, p. 449. 
33Ibid., pp. 449-50. 
34Ibid.' p. 451. 
J5Ibid. 
36 Ibid., p. 470. 
37 Ibid.' pp. 470-71. 
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At a meeting of the Central Planning Board with Sauckel present, 
Speer stated: 
We must also discuss the slackers. Ley has ascertained that 
the sicklist decreased to one-fourth or one-fifth in 
factories where doctors are on the staff who are 
examining the sick men. There is nothing to be said 
against SS and police ta.king drastic steps and putting 
those known as slackers into concentration camps, There 
is no alternative, Let it happen several times and the 
news will ~;oon go round,38 
He contradicted himself in the courtroom on this matter of using 
concentration camp workers,39 
Then, Dr. Flachsner gave Speer the opportunity to confinn 
or to deny some of Sauckel's testimony: 
Dr. Flachsner: [Youha.ve heard that Sauckel, in giving his 
tesM . mony on JO May 1946] , said that GOring par-
ticipated in the meetings of the Central Planning Board. 
Is t.ha t true? 
Speer: No, that is in no way correct. I would not have 
had any use for him, for after all, we had to carry out 
practical work. 
Dr. Flachsner: The Prosecution has submitted a statement 
by Sauckel dated 8 October 1945, according to which 
arrangE!ments for his delegates to function in the occupied 
territories were supposed to have been made by you. Is 
that true? 
Speer: No. In 1941 I had not yet anything to do with 
ann.ament; and even later, during the period of Sauckel's 
activity, I did not appoint these delegates and did 
not do much to promote their activities. That was a 40 
matter for Sauckel to handle; it was in his jurisdiction. 
Speer also disagreed with other statements. 
JSNCA, Vol. 1. pp. 898-99, 937, (R-124). 
39 Cf. If1'!'., Vol. 16, p. 472 and p. 475. 
40IM'£, Vol. 16, p. 479. 
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Ny Labor Allocation Iepartment was further mentioned by 
Sa.uckel in his testimony. 'Ibis worked as follows: 
FNery large factory and every employer of labor had an 
allocation department which, naturally, ca.me under mine. 
None of these departments, however, encroached in the 
slightest degree of Sauckel' s tasks. '!heir sphere of 
activity was not very great, as may be seen from the fact 
that each was one of 50 or 60 departments coming under 
my office. If I had attached very much importance to it, 
it would have been one of my six or eight branch offices. 
Sauckel further mentional the Sta.bsleiter 
discussions which took place in his office. A represen-
ta. tive of my Labor Allocation Department for Amy and 
Navy anna.ment and for building attended these conferences. 
At these meetings, which were attended. by about 15 people 
who were in need of labor, the question of priority was 
settled on the basis of Sauckel's information on the 
state of economy generally. 'Ihese were really the 
functions erroneously ascribed. here to the Central Planning 
Board. 
In addition it was asserted that I promoted 
the transport of foreign workers to Gemany in April 
1942 and that I was responsible for the fact that foreign 
workers were brought to Gemany at all. That, however, 
is not true. I did not need to use any inf1uence on 
Sauckel to attain that. In any case, it is evident from 
•• a docUI!lent in my possession--the minutes of a FUhrer 
conference of 3 May 1942--that the introduction of compul-
sory labor in the western region was approved by the 
.. Fuhrer at Sauckel's suggestion. 
I can further quote a speech, which I delivered on 
18 April 1942, showing that at that period I was still 
of the opinion that the German building industry, which 
employed approximately 1.8 million workmen was to be 
discontinued to a large extent to divert the necessary 
labor to the production of armaments. This speech which 
I made to my staff; in which I explained my principles 
and also discussed. the question of manpower does not 
contain any mention of the planning of a foreign labor 
draft. If I had been the active instigator of these plans, 
surely I would have mentioned the subject in this speech. 
Finally, in connection with Sauckel's testimony, I 
must correct the plan of the organization submitted here. 
It is incorrect in that the separate sectors enumerated 
in it are classified under various ministries. In reality 
these sectors of employers of labor were classified 
undervarl.ous economic branches, independently of the 
ministries. They only t:orresponded. where my own Ministry 
and the Air Ministry were concerned. 
It is also incorrect in stating that the building 
industry was represented in the Ministry of Economics. 
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1h:Lt cane under my jurisdiction, From 1943 on, the 
chemical and mining industries, both of which are listed 
under the Ministry of Economics, were under my juris-
diction, To my Jr...nowledge, these branches were repre-
sented through plenipotentiaries in the Fbur Year Plan 
even prior to September 1943 and stated their requirements 
directly to Sauckel independently of the Ministry of 
Economics, 
This plan further is incorrect in stating that 
the demand for these workers from individual employers 
went directly to Hitler. It would have been impossible 
for Hitler to settle this dispute between 15 employers, 
As I have already said, the latter attended the Stabsleiter 
conferences, over which Sauckel presided, 41 
Furthermore, Speer declared that he "never made statements regarding 
ideology, anti-Semitism, et cetera. 1142 Nor did Speer appeal to superior 
orders to save him, but assumed his share of responsibility for 
catastrophes before the Gennan people,43 
Speer statc...>d that Hitler deceived all of the people "by holding 
out to the military leaders false hopes in the success of diplomatic 
steps and by promising the political leaders fresh victorious battles 
by means of new troops and new weapons," Speer referred to his 
speeches through which he opposed Hitler on such matters.44 "In 
Hitler's own end he [Hitler] .saw the end of the German. people and 
risked their lives as well."4-5 Probably the Tribunal was more lenient 
on Spe~r because he had opposed Hitler, even plotting to kill him many 
41 Ibid. ' pp. 480-81 • 
42 Ibid. , p, 481 ; Homze says , that in Sa uckel' s plans , there was 
"racialism," in Homze, Foreign Labor, p. 127, However, "the longer 
the war dragged on, the less important racial considerations became." 
(See Ibid., p. 276.) 
43 D1T, Vol, 16, p, 483, 
44Ibid.' p. 485. 
45Ibid., p. 493; See also Speer, M~moirs, p. 293. 
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times, On one occasion he wanted to introduce gas into the ventilator 
of the air-conditioning plant, which was in the garden of the Reich 
Chancellery, In the middle of February 1945, Speer sent for Stahl, 
the head of Speer's main department. He had worked in close co-
operation with him during the time in order to obtain a new poisionous 
gas which was only effective when made to explode at a high temperatm:•!, 
However, an explosion was not possible since the air-conditioning 
plant was made of thin sheets of tin, which would have_ been torn to 
pieces by the explosion. As a result, Speer arranged to have the 
antigas filter switched off more than normal by Hanschel, the chief 
engineer of the Chancellery, He could then use the ordinary type of 
gas. Hanschel remained unaware of Speer's purpose. When the time 
came for putting his plan to work, SpeHr discovered that on Hi tlcr' s 
personal order this ven·tilator had recently been surrounded by a 
46 
chimney four mPters high, Hence, his plan ended in failure. 
Upon cross-examination, Speer acknowledged before Jackson and 
the Tribunal that he had known of the Ffuirer's decision to approve all 
coercive measures f'or obtaining labor if they could not be obtained 
on a voluntary basis, He admitted that he did not give any particular 
attention to the legal. side, and that he was after manpower. He br:licw;d 
that all the violations of international law had already bE:Hi corimitv:: 
before he took office. 47 More than any of the other prosecutors, thr, 
Russian prosecutor, M, Y, Raginsky, (and the other Russians for that 
46rz.rT, Vol. 16, p. 495; Hamsher, Alb~'rj:. Spee!, pp. 178-85. 
47IMT, Vol. 16, p. 521, 
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matter) seemed to be more prejudiced against Speer.48 
William Hamsher stated that important documents were not 
available for Speer's trial, but they finally showed up. Nevertheless, 
Speer did not know whether they would have helped him.49 In his 
Memoirs, Speer stated that .Sauckel had tried to make a better case 
for himself by labeling him as solely responsible for the importation 
of foreign workers.· 50 He confessed that he had contradicted himself 
when he said that he had never read Mein Kampf .51 
Davidson stated that Speer highly approved of concentration-
camp labor for his war industries. He al.so us~ prisoners-of-war, 
volunteers, and forced laborers. 
In his countless reports, memoranda, and speeches, he advocated 
that they be adequately fed and rewarded for their perfonnance. 
In the environment of hostility and violence in which he 
operated, he was one of the mildest of the top government of-
ficials. He believed that evezy Ge man should do his or 
her part."52 
As a :result of Speer's efforts, Geman war production boomed especially 
toward. the end of his ministzy in 1944-45. 
Alan S. Milward stated that "Speer had pl.ans for a peaceful. 
solution to the war which envisaged a Europe reconstructed on lines 
no:t u.Tllike the present Common Market • .. 53 His predecessor, Todt, began 
48 Ibid., pp • .582-84. 
49Hamsher, Albert Speer, pp. 222-23. 
c:o 
./ Speer, Memoirs, p. 508. Sauckel, Gilbert found, was angzy at 
Speer for having put him in a bad light with respect to slave labor. 
(See Gilbert, Nurf',mberg Diary, p. 394.) 
.51speer, Memoirs, p. 509. 
52Davidson, Trial of the Gennans, p. 495. 
53Milward, New Order, p. 28. 
62 
the reorganization of the German war economy, He abandoned the 
Blitzkrieg and geared the German economy to a :full-scale war. After 
Todt's death his successor continued his work with even greater zeal • .54 
Speer increased German aircraft production, but was reluctant to 
utilize French capacity too far since assurance of enthusiastic work 
done in an occupied country could not be guaranteed,55 In 1941 Gemany 
moved away f'rom the idea of plunder to the idea of an organized 
exploitation of the French economy. In 1942 the Geman government 
abandoned the Blitzkrieg economic strategy and advocated increased 
exploitation,56 By the autumn of 1942, out of 5,093,000 workers in 
the Gennan Reich, 1,341,000 were French.57 Speer believed the French 
workers were more efficient than others, Yet, the Russian women 
were the best laborers of them all, 58 
'Ihe Tribunal pointed out much of the e.vidence against Speer, 
Sauckel, and other Nazi leaders in "The Slave Labor Program, 'Ihe 
TI.legal Use of Prisoners of War, and the Special Responsibility of 
Sauckel and Speer Therefor • .. 59 'Ihe opening words appear as follows: 
In general. terms, the basic elements of the Nazi foreign 
labor policy consisted of mass deportation and mass enslavement. 
It was a policy of underfeeding and overworking foreign laborers, 
of subjecting them to eveey fonn of degradation and brutality, 
54 Ibid. , p • 78. 
55 6 Ibid., pp. 8 -7. 
56 Ibid., p. 109. 
57 Ibid, f pp. 112-13 I 
58 Ibid., p. 274. 
59NCA, Vol. 1, pp. 875-948; Ibcumentary listing on pp, 940-48. 
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It was a policy which compelled foreign workers and prisoners 
of war to manufacture armaments and to engage in other operations 
of war directed against their own countries, It was, in short, 
a policy which constituted a f1agrant violation of the laws 
of war and the laws of humanity. 
Fritz Sauckel and Albert Speer are principally 
responsible for the formulation of this policy and for 
its execution, Sauckel the Nazis Plenipotentiary General 
for Manpower, directed recruitment, deportation, and 
allocation of foreign civilian labor. Sanctioning and 
directing the use of force as a means of recruitment, 
he was responsj.ble for the mistreatment of the enslaved 
millions. Speer--as Reichsminister for Amaments and 
Munitions, Director of the Organization Todt, and member 
of the Central Planning Board--bears responsibility for 
the determination of the numbers of foreign slaves re-
quired by the Ge:man war machine, :fbr the decision to 
recruit by force, and for the use and brutal treatment of 
foreign civilians and prisoners of war in the manufacture of 
a:mamrmts and munitions, in the construction of forti-
fications, and in active military operations. 
Hermann Goering, as Plenipotentiary General for the 
Four Year Plan, is also responsible for all the crimes 
involved in the Nazi slave labor program. In addition, 
Alfred Rosenberg as Reichsminister for the Occupied 
Ba.stem Territories, Hans Frank as Govemor General. of 
the Government-General of Poland, Artur Seyss-Inquart as 
Reichskommissar for the Occupied Netherlands, and 
William Keitel as chief of the OKW share responsibility for 
the recruitment by force and terror and for the de-
portation to Germany of the citizens of the areas over-
run or subjugated by the Weh:macht.60 
Sauckel not only recruited Russians and Poles, but also Italians, 
Dutch, Belgians, Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, Balts, Greeks, Luxembourgers, 
Hungarians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, and others as workers, prison•."rs-of-
war, and politicals, totaling 6,691,000. 61 Speer put the foreign workers 
to use as Head of the Armaments Program, The Tribtmal also indicated 
60Ibid, , 875 p. • 
61 Ibid., p. 894. Homze listed as many as 36 million workers 
in Germany al together with 12 million foreign workers. (See Homze, 
Foreign~. pp. 153, 231.) Other authors differ, but one can estimate 
that at least 5 or 6 million foreign workers were employed in Gennany 
at the end of the war, with approximately 14 or 15 nillion workers in all. 
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62 that the labor had been taken from concentration camps. It entitled 
another section of the evidence, "The Special Responsibility of Sauckel. 1163 
64 It concluded with "The Special Responsibility of Speer." One can 
see that Speer confinned the use of prisoners of wa.r.65 There can be 
no doubt that workers ca.me against their own w111. 66 
The Prosecution summed up the case against Speer on 8 January 
1946: 
But unlike Sauckel, Speer's criminal activity went sub-
stantially beyong the realm of slave labor. His was 
one of the master minds in the plan for the systematic 
robbery and SDoliation of the lands overrun by the German 
war machines.67 
Jackson stated that Speer, however, had opposed the continuance of 
war and greatly objected to Hitler's orders to demolish bridges, high-
ways, and factories in order to prevent their falling into Allied 
68 hands. He later said that "Speer was the best man in the dock, in 
my opinion. I think he would have the highest I.Q. and if I were 
picking one to acquit, I'd pick Speer on the theor-J that he would do 
more for Germany in the reconstruction than any of the othErs,"69 
62 NCA, Vol 1. pp. 914-21. 
63Ib"d 1 • ' pp. 921-30. 
64 933-40. Ibid.' pp. 
65Ib"d 
1 • ' p. 933. 
66Ib"d 
1 • ' p. 936, (3720-PS), 
67 IMT, Vol. 4, p. 531. 
68 .. Jackson, Nurnberg Case, pp. 254-55. 
69Quoting Jackson, in Gerhart, America's Advocate, p, 408, 
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A prison psychologist found that Speer was a candid, friendly 
personality. He was more interested in architecture than in the 
Trial itself. He adjusted to the Trial without exercising too much 
tension.7° 
Speer's defense attorney, Dr. Hans Flachsner, in his final 
argum€nt for Speer71 asserted: 
We must start, therefore, from the principle that those 
areas belonging to signatories of the Hague Convention 
on Land Warfare must be judged on a different legal basis 
from areas belonging to nonsignatories of the treaty.72 
rh moved fo:r acquittal on Counts One and Two because Speer had as-
sumed office a~er aggressive war occurred.7.3 Flachsner stated that 
Speer was not responsible for all the mt.asures ordered by Sauckel.74 
He further argued that the employment of prisoners-of-war in the industry 
of the holding country was not prohibited by the Geneva Prisoners of 
War Convention.75 
Moreover, the witnesses, Von Poser, KP..mpf, Schieber, Kerl, 
Bohland, Seyss-Inquart, and Hirschfeld testified that Speer authorized 
non-destruction of industries after the success of the Allied Fbrces.76 
Fl.achsner appealed to one Tribunal, indicating that Speer did everything 
----·-·---
?O Andrus, Infamous of Nurem be.r.g, pp • 1 72-7.3 • 
71p1T, Vol. 19, pp. 1.77-216; NCA, Supp. B. pp. 895-934, 
72n1T, Vol. 19, p. 180. 
73 Jbid.' p. 177. 
'71+ 
' Ibid., p. 190. 
75Th'd 
. 11. • t p. 199, 
761b"d l. ·• ' p. 212. 
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in his Power, beginning at the age of thirty-six as Annaments Minister, 
to solve the life-and-death dilemma of his country. ''He realized only 
too late that Hitler was not thinking of his people, but only of 
himself. .. 77 Speer still felt that he was "the servant of his people 
and his nation, Speer had to betray Hitler in order to remain loyal 
to his people ... 78 
Speer likewise in his final plea79 condemned Hitler just as 
"the German people in time will condemn Hitler as the proven originator 
of its misery, and despise him • .. Bo He had this to say about Hitler 
and his dictatorship: 
Hitler not only used technical developments to 
dominate his own people--he had nearly succeeded, by 
means of his technical lead, in subjugating the whole of 
Europe. It was merely due to some principal shortcomings 
or organization, such as are typicaJ for a dictatorship 
because of the absence of criticism that before 1942 
he did not have twice as many tanks, aircraft, and sub-
marines,.,. 
'Ihe more technical the world becomes the greater 
will be this danger and the more serious will be an 
established lead in the sphere of the modern means of 
warfare,81 
Speer further warned against man's use of atomic power. 
He concluded with words very pertinent for all posterity: 
It is not the battles of war alone which shape the history 
of humanity; they are, in a higher sense, the cultural con-
tributions which one day will become the common property 
77Ibid., p. 216. 
78Ibid. 
79 NCA, Supp, B, p. 
80Ibid., p. 934. 
81 Ibid,' p. 935. 
934-37 I 
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of all humanity. But a nation believing in its future 
will never perish. May God protect Gennany and the 
culture of the Occident.82 
'!he Tribunal, in its judgment of Speer, found him not guilty 
of Counts One and 'l'wo for the following reasons:83 
The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer's activities do 
not amount to initiating, planning, or preparing wars of 
agression, or of conspiracy to that end. He became the 
head of the. annament industry well after all of the wars 
had been commenced and were under way. His activities in 
charge of Gennan annament production were in aid of the 
war effort in the same way that other productive enter-
prises aid in the waging of war; but the Tribunal is not 
prepared to find that such activities involved engaging 
in the common plan to wage aggressive war as charged 
under Count One, or waging aggression war as charged under 
Count Two.84 
On the other hand, the Tribunal found Speer guilty under Counts 
'Ihree and Four.85 They sentenced him to twenty years imprisonment.86 
Gilbert stated that Speer was against Hitler's "scorched earth" 
policy,87 Unlike Sauckel, who cried at the sentence (and probably 
- 88 
anybody would at death) which he did not consider fair) Speer 
1 aughed nervously since it seemed fail enough. 89 During all this timf;, 
82 Ibid., pp. 936-)7. 
83n1T, Vol. 22, pp • .576-79; NCA, Opinion and JudgmE"nt, pp. 156-59. 
84n1T, Vol. 22, p. 577. 
85Ib"d J. • ' pp. 579, 589. 
86Ib.d J. • , p. 589; NCA, Qpinion and Judgment.J p, 190; Il1T, Vol. 1 , 
PP. ~566-67. 
87Gilbert, Psychology of Dictatorship, pp. 2}4-J5. 
88Gu bert, Nuremberg Dl;y:y, p. 43 J. 
s9Ibid. 
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he expressed constant concern for the German people90 and did not 
deny his guilt.91 Speer stated that "I don't want to make myself any 
prettier than I am, .. 92 
'Ihe lfow York Times reported that Speer, upon taking the stand 
.on 19 June 1946, said that he served his country as "a business man 
and not as a fanatical Nazi."93 He said that he had handled the task 
"as if it was done in the United States by bringing in the best men 
that he could find in German industry. I am responsible to my con-
science and the German people."94 
"Speer Alleges He Planned to Kill Hitler By Throwing Ga.s 
'Ihrough Air-Raid Bunker" appeared in an article in the New York Times 
on 21 June 1946.95 " [The gas] could not be used because it had 
to reach a high temperature and the explosion would have wrecked the 
air-conditioning plant.96 He aJ.so said that "a chimney had also 
spoiled the pl_ot and the plan had been dropped • .,97 Noveover, he believed 
that Hitler betrayed the German poople by continuing the war a:~~r 
90Ibid., p. 104. 
91Ibid,' p. 167. 
92Ibid. 
93New York Times, 20 June 1946, sec. J, p. 13. 
94Ibid. 
95Ibid,, 21J.une1946, sec. 2, p. 9. 
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. 
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Janua __ ry of' 191.~5. Thr Tribunal sentenced Speer to twenty years im-
. 98 prisonm< nt. Hence, one can see that the New York Times are quite 
consistent in matching the sources, (even though the distance was far 
wtvm con.'l11mication can often get mixed up and authenticity may lose 
some of its flavor). 
On 30 September 1966 Speer was released from Spandau Prison 
in Berlin aJ.ong with Baldur von Schirach, the former Youth Leader 
of the German Reich. Speer believed that the Nuremberg TriaJ. was 
(-ssentiaJ.,99 and that he had received a just sentence.100 
98 Ibi'd., 2 0 t b 1946 8 1 c ·o er, , sec. , p. • 
99Hamsher, Albert Speer, p, 64. 
100Ib'd 6 1 • , p. • 
CHAPTER VI 
'IHE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 
'Ihe Nuremberg Trials are thirty years old, but the moral, legal 
aspects remain with us. Writers have discussed such questions as ~ 
post facto laws, superior orders, Allied aggression, justice, and ad 
hoc establishments, political manipulation, and victors v. vanquished 
when viewing the Nuremberg Trials. Many spoke out in defense of Nur-
emberg, but others were more acrimonious in their animadversions. 
Congressional opposition increased in the U.S. after the 
Tribunal concluded its operation. Bitter partisan politics flamed 
out again; the advent of the Cold War caused much criticism of Nurem-
berg and in general dissent arose among the American people, Some 
claimed that the Trials were mismanaged. 1 Yet, the majority of tht· 
American people believed that justice reigned.2 The New York Times 
also championed the Trials} At the same time the twelve subsequent 
trials of "Nazi War Criminals" continued from 1946 until 1949.4 The 
Control Council of Germany proceeded to enact Law ?;umber 10 which gav~ 
1Bosch, Judgment oo Nuremberg, pp. 81-2. 
2 Ibid.' pp. 91-4. 
)Ibid., p. 99; New York Times, 1October1946, sec. 1, p. 1. 
4 Silvergate, "Conspiracy Doctrine," p. 2; Davidson, ?rial of 
of the Germans, pp. 28-9. 
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the four Zone Commanders the power to designate tribunals for the 
punishment of other "war criminals," basing their crimes on the Nurem-
berg precedent. This law did not apply to the British zone. 5 In 
6 Tokyo, Japan, the trial resembled in general the Nuremberg precedent. 
The Tokyo Tribunal was composed of members from eleven nations. 7 
Jewish newspapers and periodicals abhorred the "lenient" sentences 
8 q given at Nuremberg. 'lhe Protestants in general defended Nuremberg.; 
Most American lawyers favored the work of the Tribunal, and 75 percent 
of the articles and literature since have leanings toward Nuremberg. 10 
'lhe majority of texts, on the other hand, found faults with its work, 11 
And American historians have criticized Nuremberg, ho1tever there are 
some that defended its justice.12 
One of the biggest ,scandals of justice was the Russian role 
in the Trials. They should not have been allowed to participate in 
the Trials at all. On 23 August 1939 the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed 
13 in the Kremlin. Superficially drawn up as a Non-Aggression Pact, 
~augham, U.N,O. and War Crimes, p, 19. 
6 Woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. 232, 
7 Ibid •• p. 228 I 
8 Bosch, Jud.gment on Nuremberg, p, 118. 
9Ibid., p, 120, 
10Ibid.' pp, 144-47. 
11 Ibid.' p. 16). 
12Ibid., p. 164. 
13 Brinton, et al., History of Civilization, pp, 431-)2. 
7? 
under which Germany and Russia pledged themselves to give no assistance 
to each other's em~mies in the event of war, it included secret clauses, 
unknown to the outside world at the time. However, these secret clauses, 
being suspected by other nations, divided eastern Europe into clearly 
demarcated German and Russian spheres of influence. 
The Nazi-Soviet Pact permitted Hitler to take action against 
western Poland and Lithuania. Stal.in could then take estern Poland, 
Latvia, l~stonia, and Finland. Thus, this Pact was greatly responsible 
for the success of Hitler's war. 
Perhaps Eugene Davidson has described the flaws of Nuremberg, 
Stal.in's crimes, and other Al.lied atrocites in the best light: 
The Nuremberg doctrines did not and do not reflect the 
actual practices of states and statesmen. The trials 
were fatal.ly flawed from the beginning, from before the 
beginning they were trial.s of the vanquished brought be-
fore the courts of the victors. No one in the world, 
neither Messrs. Roosevelt, Stimson, Jackson, nor the 
whole Nuremberg bench, could have dreamed of C.Omrade 
Stal.in's being brought to judgment before any imaginable 
court for his invasion of Finland in 1939, al.though the 
League of Nations had declared it an act of aggression 
and ousted the Soviet Union from its membership, The 
expulsion took place during the period of the Hitler-
Stal.in Pact, when the Soviet Union was regarded as an 
accomplice of National Social.1st Gennany. The German 
defendants had been accused of having waged or con-
spired to wage, aggressive war against Poland, but no 
witness in the course of the great trial was permitted 
~o point out that the Polish campaign had been waged with 
the complicity of the Soviet Union, which divided Poland 
with the Third Reich a few weeks after the Germans in-
vaded.. No Italian was tried by the Allies for invading 
France in 1940 or Greece in 1941. Italy was regarded 
as a co-belligerent by the Allies after she declared war 
on Germany on October 1J, 1943, al.though she had gone to 
war as a member of the lliropean Axis. The Nuremberg 
Court dealt with crimes of enormous magnitude committed 
by National Social.1st Germany: the killing of between 
5 and 6 million Jews, the mistreatment of millions of 
Russian prisoners of war, f eve,n though Stalin never 
... ~ 
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admitted there were Soviet prisoners-of-wa~J deportation 
of civilian populations and their forced labor, often 
under inhuman conditions. But it dealt with the crimes 
of only the one country, and along with crimes that every 
legal code in the ci vllized world regarded as punishable, 
it stigmatizes as the chief crime of aggression--which 
should perhaps be a crime in a better trorld but had no 
legal basis as such in this one, It would be difficult 
to maintain, even before a Western court, that the Soviet 
leaders, when they ordered their tanks into action in 
Hu..'lgary i.n 19 56 or in Czechoslovakia in 1968 , had any 
criminal. intent. They were doing what they considered 
essential to preserve Soviet hegemony in a vital area, 
harsh as the fate of the Hungarians and Czechoslovaks may 
have been in their morally justified struggle for in-
dependence, their revolts could readily have triggered a 
world conflict.14 
Furthennore, the immense Allied bombing of Gennan cities such as 
Dresden15 was equally as abhorre.nt. 
Francis Biddle, one of the American judges at Nuremberg, later 
told of the Katyn Forrest Massacre: 
The Katyn Woods incident was typical of the Russian 
attitude. The inclusion in the indictment of the 
allegation that the Germans had massacred eleven 
thousand Polish officers in the Katyn Forrest, on the 
banks of the Dnieper near Smolensk, was dictated solely 
by political considerations. Since there was no evidence 
that any defendant was remotely connected with the 
killings, the charge was irrelevant. Although he had 
not seen the reports indicating that the Russians them-
selves might be guilty, Jackson sensed trouble, and did 
his best to persuade them to omit the charge. But 
Rudenko jnsisted on including it, leveling the charge 
against Gbering as the highest-ranking officer among 
the defend.ants ••••• 16 
An International Medical Commission examined the corpses 0r. 
14na.vidson, Nuremberg Fallacy, pp. 285-86. 
1
.5Idem, Dea.th and I,ife of Ge:rm~, p. 66. Davidson also 
discussed the Russian plunder of cities as they entered GE:n~a.ny. 
(See Ibid., p. 74.) 
16Francis Biddle, "Nuremberg: The Fall of the, Supel."7'.";i:-n," 
AmPrican Hcri:tage 12 (August 19620: 69-70. 
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29 and 30 April 1953, finding pistol bullets in the back of many of 
the necks. 17 Accordingly, why did the Tribunal allow the Germans to 
take the blame for this incident? They definitely should have spoken 
out at the time. A committee of the U.S. House of Representatives 
in 1952 left little doubt that the Soviet NKVD had been guilty of the 
Katyn killings in order "to eliminate all Polish leaders who subse-
18 quently would have opposed the Soviet's pla.p for communizing Poland," 
The Russians should have been on trial for this massacre, charged 
with war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is evident that they 
definitely were on the wrong side of the bench in the Nuremberg court-
room. Yet, one can not dismiss other Allied atrocities, The best 
solution most probably would have been trial of the Germa."ls by neutrals, 
Before the start of the Trial at Nuremberg, Gering' s lawyer, 
Dr. Otto Stahmer presented a "Motion Adopted by All Defense Counsel" 
on 19 November 1945,19 He argued that a state has a right to wage 
20 
war "by virtue of its sovereignty" at any time and for any purposf-:. 
He stated that "no international law, not even the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
. 21 
was valid because of their ambiguity," "The present Trial can, there-
fore, as far as crimes against Peace shall be avenged, not invoke 
existing international law, it is rather a proceeding pursuant to a 
17Ibid., p, 70; Montgomery Belgion, Victors' Justicet A Letter 
Intended to Have Been Sent to a Friend Recently in Germany London: 
Falcon Press, 1946), p, 72. 
18 Biddle, "Nuremberg," p. 71 • 
19 68 IMT, Vol. 1, pp. 1 -70. 
20Ibid., p. 168. 
21 Ibid, 
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"Nulla Poena Sine Lege" was in jeopardy. 
Stahmer also pointed out 
another peculiarity of this Trial which departs from the 
commonly recognized principles of modern jurisprudence. 
The Judges have been appointed exclusively by States which 
were the one party in this war. This one party to the 
proceed:tng is all in one: creator of the statue of the 
Tribunal and of the rules of law, prosecutor and judge. 
It used to be until now the common legal conception that 
this should not be so; just as the United States of .America, 
as the champion for the institution of international 
arbitration and juri.sdiction, always demanded that 
neutrals, or neutrals and representatives of all parties, 
should be called to the Bench. This principle has been 
realized in a.n exemplary manner in the case of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice at the Hague.24 
Stahmer begged that "the Tribunal direct that an opinion be submitted 
by internationally recognized authorities on international law on 
the lega1 elements of this Trial under the Charter of the Tribunal • .,25 
But the plea was in vain. Nevertheless, writers on Nuremberg have: 
questioned. the Tribunal's legality, using Stahmer's arguments. 
Critics argued that some aspects of the Trial were based upon 
retroactive or ~.QC 129st facto law especially in relation to th€ first 
two counts of the indictment. They purported that no basis for the 
Trial existed in international law before the Trial took place. Op-
ponent.s of Nuremberg further contended that the Anglo-America.n legal 
doctrine of conspi.racy was used to try defendants whose own legal E}'Sk'.'". 
had no such doctrine. Accordingly, the Tribunal tried the Gem.an 
22Ibid., 
2Jib"d 1 • ' 
24Ib"d J. • f 
pp. 168-69. 
p. 169. 
pp. 169-70. 
? c: 
·-.)Ibid •• p. 170. 
defendants on a doctrine which neither they nor some of their judges 
(France and Russia) had viewed as criminal prior to the Trials. 26 On 
the other side, Robert K. Woetzel pointed out that 
thr~ court's conclusion with regard to crimes against peace 
did not violate the maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla 
Eoena sine lege •••• This was confirmed by the inter-
n~tional community which justifies the conclusion that 
the principles applied by the court were just. Since the 
maxim •• , is a principle of justice and the concept of 
crime against peace was just, the maxim was not violated 
by an application of th€ concept.27 
Another charge against Nuremberg is that the Tribunal was not 
composed of neutral judges. 28 Lord Hankey stated that "a valuable 
precedent might have been established if neutral judges would have 
served on the bench!129 Perhaps Hans Kelsen described it in the best 
way, stating that "the IMT was constituted by captors who created the 
law, prepared the indictments, brought forward the evidence, conducted 
26snvergate, "Conspiracy Ibctrine," p. 260; Appleman, Militarv 
Tribunals, pp. 39-53; Gerhart, America's Advocate, pp, 34J, 431; Benton 
and Grimm, eds., German Views of the War Trials, pp. 28-JO; Baird, 
~Nuremberg to ~iy Lai, p, 104; Glueck, Nuremberg Trial and AggressivP 
War, pp. 71-2; Phleger, "Nuremberg--A Fair Trial?" p. 63; Wyzanski, 
"Nuremberg--A Fair Trial?" p. 70; Rustem Vamberg, "Criminals and War 
Criminals," Nation 160 (May 19, 1945): 567. 
27woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials, p. 171; See al.so Bosch, 
Judgment on Nurembe_rg, p. 139; Baird, F'rom Nuremberg to ~~ Lai, pp, 
115-16; Finch, "Nuremberg Trial and International Law," p. 22; Bernays, 
"Legal Basis of th£ Nuremberg Trials," p. 8; Charles E. \iJyzanski 1 
"Nuremberg in Retrospect," Atlantic Monthly 178 (llicember 1946); 57, 
which is a different view of the Trials than his own artich0 in 
Charles E, Wyzanski, "Nuremberg--A Fair Trial.? Dangerous Frecedu.t," 
Atlan~}c fonthl;y 177 (April 1946): 66-70; Finch, "Nuremberg Trial 
and International Law," p. 33. 
28 Sil verga te, "Conspiracy Ibctrine," pp. 260-61. 
29Maugham, U.N.O. and War Crimes, "Postscript, by Lord Hankey--
' A Political Commentary'" p. 128. 
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the prosecution, and judged the defendants, .,.J However, Eer.:ian Pl:tlcger 
objected: 
Theoretically it SE:ems desirable that the Charter and the 
Tribunal should include neutral nations and neutral 
judges. But in a world where there are few, if any, 
genuine neutrals, and where the feeling was general that 
no nation should remain neutral with such issues at 31 
stake, this end was obviously not possible of attainment. 
Opponents of the conspiracy charge stressed the dangers of col-
lective responsibility or guilt by association.32 They also criticized 
the conspiracy count on the basis that it presumed the guilt of the 
defend.ants before the Trial, and that it applied to subsequent 
tribunals.33 The French Judge D:>nnedieu de Vabres even argues that 
conspiracy was a crime unknown in international law.34 Th€ justices 
finally compromised,35 even though the U.S. justice was against it.36 
Francis Biddle later changed his views. Since there were many dif-
fcrenccs in legal procedures, a number of problems developed. and they 
had to be compro~ised.37 
JOHans Kelsen, "Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Con-
stitute a Precedent in International Law, ti Interna ti~mal Law Quarterl v 
(London) 1 Sur.:.mer 1947): 154; Hans lliard, "The Nuremberg Trial Agains"t 
the Major War Criminals and International Law," in Benton and Grimm, 
eds., German Views of the War Trials, p. 102. 
3lPhleger, tlNuremberg--A Fair Trial?" p. 62. 
32suvergate, "Conspiracy IX>ctrine, ti p. 4; See also hau:gham, 
U,N,O. and War Crimes, p. 39; Benton and Grimm, eds,, Germ.c..r. ViE:ws 
of the War Trials, p, 5. 
JJSilv•,rga.te, ":;onspiracy fuctrine," pp. 4-5. 
34Ibid,, p. 172. 
'1 r.: 
_,..:;>Ibid., p, 17.3. 
36Ibid., pp. 180-81. 
3 7 Appleman, Mil?. tary Tri bur_als, p. viii. 
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Jesse Joseph Silvergate presented an interesting summation, 
which also included Allied aggression. 
Doubts about the fairness of the Trials are also raised 
by the fact that only Gennans were tried for the 
commission of acts declared criminal under the Nuremberg 
Charter. If Nuremberg was meant to establish an impartial 
precedent for the punishment of acts declared criminal 
under the Charter, why were not the Allies also prosecuted 
for violations of the Nuremberg principles? Why were 
the Russians not prosecuted for participation in plans 
for aggressive war as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Pact? 
why were the British not prosecuted for the bombing of 
German cities, such as Dresden (where some 150,000 people 
were killed, almost all non-combatants, for Dresden 
was full of refugees), or why were the Americans not 
tried. for the crimes against humanity cornmi tted by the 
dropping of atomic bombs on Japan.JS 
Richard A. Falk also looked to "the American repudiation of Nuremberg" 
in relation to Vietnam. The Soviets trampled on these principles in 
:::hstern Europe; the French, in Indochina and Algeria: and the Anglo-
French, in the Suez ca.mpaign.39 
Charles E. Wyzanski and Robert K. Woetzel acknowlHdged that thr 
liuremberg Tribunal was an ad hoc court.40 Furthermore, one can sec 
from the Conferences during World War II and also the difficulties 
41 during the beginning of the Trial, that politics was involved. The 
38sn vergate, "Conspiracy Doctrine," pp. 261-62. 
39Richard A, Falk, "Nuremberg: Past, Present, and Lturr-," ir; 
Baird, From Huremberg to My Lai, p. 284; See also Iavidsor., ~urenberf~ 
Fallacv; Telford Taylor, Nurember~ an,Si Vietncgn_: , An America!': Tra.::::edv. 
( C:hicago : Quadrangle Books, 1970 • 
40 Wyzanski, "Nuremberg in Retrospect," p. 59; Woetzel, Nur-
emberg Trials, p. 40, 
41Maugham, U ,N .o. and War Crimes, "Postscript, by Lord Hankey--
' A Political. Commentary'" pp, 110-2J; Jessu~ Modern Law~, p. 9?; 
L':rnest 0, Hauser, "The Backstage BattlP. at Nuremberg," Satc.:rtlav E~r:ni . .!2f, 
Post ?18 (July 19, 1946): 18 f;t seq,; Wyzanski im;"lfod thc..t it was 
political justice, not legal justice. (SPc l'iyz,a,11zki, 11 hU2'.'"':·:bro:rt;--f1 
r·air Trial?'' p. 70.) 
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Russians wanted to decide things for the.mselves and the .Americans, pushed 
by public opinion, carried the other illies into the Trial. The 
United States seemed to be very concerned over drafting the aggressive 
war counts and controlling them. Officials in Washington pressed 
for this action as if private gain and vengeance prevailed over states-
man-like co-operation for the common good. 
The Nazi defendants sought to prove that others had done exactly 
what they were accused of doing thn>ughout the war. They tried to 
justify·theiracts by the state of war, that they were individually 
against war, desiring peace as loving fathers and husbands and as model 
citizens. And finally, they pleaded to superior's orders: that they 
were Hitler's pawns, 42 WritErs have usually been more ciritcal of 
the appeal to superior's orders, siding wiih the Tribunal. 43 
Only 4,000 out of the 100,000 captured documents were trans-
lated. But Jackson felt that this numberwas sufficient to convict 
the defendants, 44 Could translation of the other 96, 000 ha W-: made a 
better case for them? Jackson also pointed out that Hitler ignored 
international treaties, citing a document that Hitler signed--"declar-
ations of neutrality must be ignored, .. 45 George Creel felt that the 
42Gerhart, America's Advocate, p, 38; Superior orders were 
never recognized by Germa.n, Russian, French, or American law. (Su; 
Wyzanski, "Nuremberg--A Fair Trial?" pp. 66-7,) Eaugham disagrees 
with Glueck in Maugham, U,N,O. and War Crimes, p. 77. 
43Morgan, Great Assize, p, 3; Phleger, "Nuremberg--/.. Fair Trial'?" 
p. 64; Ii'inch, "Nuremberg Trial and International Law," p. ;.1, 
44 Jackson, Nttrnberg Case, p. viii. 
45 . Ibid., p, 146; Glueck, Nuremberg Trial and .Aggrr-:ssivc War, 
p. BJ. 
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statement by the Allies in conference during the war, "Germ.an criminals 
whose offenses have no particular geographical localization ••. will br: 
punished by joint decision of the governffif:nts of the Allies," con-
tained no mode of operations and could result in a ridicule of justice.46 
b'ugene Ihvidson stated that the Tribunal surprised the defendants with 
documents and witnesses.47 In another book he remarked that the legal 
48 procedures weirc unfamiliar to the German people. 
Sheldon Glueck stated that 
The duty of a State as a member of the Family of Nations 
to punish violations of the prohibitation.s imposed by the 
law of nations is a matter of international law; but 
whether any particular local sovereignty requires prior 
specific "implementation" of international law by 
"conversion" of its prohibitions into those of municipal 
criminal or military law, or prefers to punish them 
directly without such intercession of domestic legislation, 
is a matter of each State's own constitution--an arrangement 
of municipal law. 49 
John Alan Appleman stated: 
But since all states including Germany, have freely 
admitted that there are some concepts of international 
law which are binding, then admittedly there is no such 
thing as absolute sovereignty.50 
r<.oreover, such things as murder are violations of the Gerrr.an penal 
1 -•T 51 
.,.,..". And more true to the point, murder has been regarded as a crir,, 
46creel, War Criminals, p, 164. 
47 D<widson, Trial of the wrmans, p. 32; See also Id~0:;-i, fr,·a th 
?-nd Lifr· of Gennany, p. 122. 
p. 8. 
48Ibid. 
49Glueck, Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, pp. 65-6. 
50 Appleman, Mil.~ta1:1 Tribunals, p. 14. 
51 Ibid., p. 29; Bernays, "Legal Basis of the 1:ure.J11berg Trials," 
throughout history. 
Rustem Vamberg asserted that "the Tribunal gave a false showing 
of justice with three acquittals ... .52 "There was indeed, nothing wrong 
with the Nurnberg trial except its psychological background and its 
juridical foundation.".53 In another article he said that the Tribunal 
was "observing the legal formalities while ignoring the legal principles ... 54 
He pointed out in his other articles as well that it was necessary to 
preserve the law by acting in a just manner.55 
One can not dismiss the atrocities of the Germans on the other 
hand, since the wanton all-out destruction of an innocent people is 
morally wrong. Robert K. Woetzel put it quite well: 
..• the following is clear; leaders of a nation were 
trif:d for offences against international law and 
morality, against compacts and treaties, and against 
the peace of nations; 
they could not hide behind the shield of sovereignty; 
their laws were no excuse, where such laws were 
unjust and contrary to recognized principles of law and 
morality; .56 
their official capacity did not protect them. 
52 Rustem Vamberg, "The Law of the Tribunal," Na ti on, 163 (October 
12, 1946): p. 400; See also Stone's views in Alpheus T. Eason, Harlan 
F. Stone; Pill§.]." of the Law (New York: Viking Press, 1956), p. 715, J-w 
sc·emed against the proceedings when Biddle was appointed; he appeared 
somtwhat jealous of Jackson's position in Ibid., pp. 714-19. 
5Jvamberg, "Law of the Tribunal," p. 400, 
54Ruztem Vamberg, "Law and LegaJ.ism," Nation 161 (Decemb(;r 1, 1945): 
575. 
!' c 
.:>.JidP..m, "Criminals and War Criminals," Nation 160 (Lay 19, 1945); 
.567-63. 
56woetzel, Nuremberg Trials, p. X.l.J.J.. For the horrible atrocities 
inflicted. on other peoples by the Nazis, conff;r such work~ c..;:; Eugen Kogon, 
The Tncory and Practice of Hell: The Gcrrri<:~n Concen'tration ~mps and thr 
;.~·str:~·, 1'<:hj~E!.f. trans, from the Genria.n by Heinz !;ordcn (:;ew York: 
Berkley Publishing Corp., 1950); Creel, War Criminals; r•;ovir· "N:ight and Foe"; 
alwarci Crankshaw, Gestauo: Instrument of ?yranr,y (l;ew York: Viking 1-'rr.:::::;:::., 
1956.) 
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J. H. forgan stated that the Trial. was "fully justified fron an ethical 
point of view. ,.5? But the author of' this study poses the following 
questions: Were not the signatories of the Tribunal. guilty of similar 
crimes as the German Nazi leaders? Were they free from Macbeth's 
evil? Were they morally justified for what they did? Were they not 
hypocrities? The author of this study questions the total justification 
of the four victorious nations sitting on the Tribunal since they 
were not free from guilt. Upon entering Germany during the last 
stages of the war, the Allies had bombed German cities where high 
concentrations of civilians were living. The Russians even used. 
German prisoners-of-war as slave labor not only during the war but 
also nany years afterwards.· At the same time the other Allied Powers 
forced Germans to labor in their own countries as well. 
57 Morgan, Great Assize, p. v. 
CONCLUSION 
From the evidence presented at the Nuremberg Tr1aJ.s of Fritz 
Sauckel and Albert Speer, one can not deny that these two men were 
quil ty of the crimes the TribunaJ. convicted them of. It is evident 
that both men did not take part in planning an aggressive war. How-
ever, they did use forced labor, and in the end, sanctioned harsh 
punishments for violations. Sauckel exploited the workers in regard 
to their f'ullest output, disregarding a great deaJ. of expense for 
their upkeep, On the other hand, Speer, even though he adopted cruel 
standards at times, answered as a man who had faJ.len into a trap 
under the sway of Hitler's power, displaying his ardent love for the 
German pc-ople and their lifelihood. Nost assuredly, the difference 
in these two men's attitudes had a lot to do with their sentences for 
Speer tried to allegedly assassinate Hitler several times. Both 
of thcs~ men were guilty under the law established in the London 
Charter, 8 August 1945. 
One has to admit that murder is a crime, and the Nazi leaderr. 
were not innocent. Yet, one can not ignore the fact that the victors 
were gull ty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, too. For a 
trial to take place of this magnitude, true justice could only be 
c·:n:-rciscd by a team of neutral judges. .And accordingly, crimes such 
a0::. Stalin's would have to be tried, too. A committee of the Unikd 
States House of Representatives in 1952 found that the Russians wnrc 
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quil ty of' the, Katyn Forest Eassacre of 11,000 Polish officers in 19h2, 
At the Trial the Russian prosecutor, Rudenko, asserted the the Germans 
undf;r the auspices of GOring bad ordered the massacr8. The :!tussians 
had also invaded Iiinland and the Bal tic state~:--was this not aggres-
sion? What about other Allied aggression? 
The Cfrmans had used forced labor. But under Allied Control 
Law No. 3 of 17 February 1946, Gem.an males fron. fourteen to sixty-five 
and women from fifteen to fifty could be forced to work •1 The American 
Zons in Genrrany employed forced labor; the Russians used it after 
th~, war to rebuild Stalingrad and to develop a Soviet rockst procra:i / 
'11he A:-:-ericans gave rrance hundreds of thousands of German prisonc·rs. 
Ai.'tc:r' the GE: mans surrEndered the British and the Americans :put 
Germc..rl prisoners to work in their own countries, Thousands of Genna.r,::. 
".I 
laborr·C.: ir. RiJ.ssia until the mid-1950's/ 0/en durine; the wa:'.'.', the 
?.ussiar.:.s forced more than 2 ,500 ,000 Gennan prisoners t.o perform r.arci 
4 
st:n:onous tasks. The U. S, put the Japanese, in co!1centra tion c;irrp::;, 
but th0 standards were much better than those ir. thr; German can:ps. 5 
Di ... vie sor; ct.2- ted that "the country in effect becamr..' an irimn:ss cor,-
6 
c'ntr&tion camp," when the Allies enterPd Germany. 
In total evaluation, the Trial of 1945-46, with special t.r:i,,::.t<:·_, 
1 ~ ._, ~·ai f'q ,..._ "1'"' lJiiVl.C.SOn, Tr1 o· "i.£1.8 Vl::rrnans, Ii• .J O, 
2
.,.b.d 
.L 1 • 
< /Ibid,~ pp, 518-19. 
t Ibici. , p • 519. 
5Ibid. I p. 584, 
/ 
~;Idem, DPath and Life of Gcnnanv, p, 89. 
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upon Sauckel and ;;.ii;eer in this study, was carried out in all the 
impa.rtiali ty and fai!'ness that mEO;n of calibre and reputation can 
ascertain. There was nothing in these two meri' s trials to warrant 
suspicion that they W(:re tried unfairly. The lawyers that were as-
siGTied to Sauckr!.l and Speer were the best possible defense they could 
r~vr: had. L\ren though Sauckel' s defense seerad to be too hard on 
Sauckol at timf'~S, both lawyers wanted to get at the heart of the matter, 
trying to prove their defendant's innocence if it could be established. 
Their trials were fair. In general, translation difficulties were 
:not too big of a problem. Within the stipulations of the Charter 
to a small degree) the Trial was fair, bu~ 
1)syond fairness, was it just? What was the state of Germany at the 
tir.i•0 ? What was the internatior.al law? 
1/hcn consid.\<;rir:.g the legal and moral aspects of th€ Trial, 
or.~; has to review for sane time. The Nazis were certainly not justifiHl 
:for what trv"'Y did, cspeciall~, in relation to crimes against hu,rnanity, 
On th•' othE:r hand, the Allies were not free from guilt. It should 
br: re:iteratcd that justicf: of these standards should not have br:~-r. 
;:;,llowccJ to have taken plac12 at all. Nuremberg as r:a."'1y wr:.. tcrs (i'.,-
cl udir;g the author of this study) have assertf:d was a "travi:-·st.y of 
v•:ry valua.rJlE: purpose and an indispensable precedent if a d.i.r:·r:rcnt 
course of action had been followed. If the legal f::-a:,1f::worJ.: would 
7wyzanski, "Nurenberg--A Fair Trial?' 
i.r.d~-n;on, "'Ynf: Uti1i ty of the Proposed Trial 
Lead1 r:;;" American F°:Jl i ti cal _.§cience fa-:_ViN: 
10hi:3-90. 
p. 69; 3es o.lso C, Amolc5. 
and Pu:;.ishmc-n-: of ~c:ny 
~~ (~P~~7·00r •2a1). -~· ,;,.,;_ ...... _ .. --- -,,, -~1· 
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have br~f':n cst2.blishcd bi:,forehand in th"'' Ki: llogf,-Briand Pact so that 
th0 sp . -,cH'ic method of operation and punishment was laid down, then 
there would have been a precedent in internationaJ. law for "triaJ. of 
war criminals." ?ven then, under the circll!f:stances of Russia and 
the victorious powers being the Tribunal (author, judg&, and prosecutor 
in one package), justice would not prevail, Had they not been guilty 
of crimes similar to those of Gennany? Perhaps triaJ. by neutrals 
would have been the best solution. The author was shocked when 
looking over the legaJ. arrl moral aspects of the Trial. Silvergatr: 
stated: 
The' charge that Nuremberg did not represent impartial, 
international justice, but was victors sitting in judgr;;cnt 
over the vanquished also raises doubts about the Trials. 
Si::ct; all the judges at NurrnJ.berg were members of the 
victorious allies, row can one speak of the Mili ta:cy 
:·ribunals as either impartial or international? Fbr 
i;urmbcrg to have been truly international and inpartial 
the Allies should have included judges from neutral 
countries as well as a Gennan justice. Finally, the 
iffipartiality of the Tribunal is brought into serious ques-
tion by the inclination of Nikitchenko as the Russian 
judcn. Since Nikitcbenko had participated in drafting 
the Nuremberg Ch3.rter at the London Conference, would 
it not h3.ve been wiser to have chosen someone not conn€c~cd 
with the legislation of the Nuremberg law to sit in 
judgm"mt? A similar question could be raised about thro 
selection of Biddle as the American judge, since he 
lud been involved in the drafting of the Yalta 1·iemorandLL"':, 
which stressed the application of conspiracy charges 
L-;;ainst the Nazis. As it turned out, Biddle changed his 
';c:,rlier views and became the most out~poken critic of -;,r,c 
coriS}Jiracy do ct rim-: at Nu rem berg. But President '1'ruma::-. 
could not have been aware of Biddle's chanec of hf:~art 
c:.-:; thr: timfe of his appointment. Pcrha.I'S, if Trurr.an hac3. 
bv}n, Biddle would not rove, been appointctl. 8 
The second point to consider is the sta tc or condi.tion of 
0 
uSilvergate, "Conspiracy IbctrinP," pp. 260-61; See also 
Belf:'"ion, Victors' Justicr; for morf~ infonnation on th< T:ric~l s in 
this :s3.nr: light. 
G1:ri~anJ after World 1'12..r I. Various political ·partii:::.s st.:rovr: to r;ain 
th'? upper hand in lrlTrnan.y, contributinr; to the confusion and disarray. 
Later on GFrmany disbanded the "wrech~;d" Treaty of Versailles and 
thr; Briand-Kdlogc Pact undE:r the will of Hitler. YE:t, the only pro-
bh:m with that treaty is that it stated no specifics for violations 
of aggression. Whc,n any country is subjected to sdf-denial, it 
netaliates. Ta.kine; advcritag-:: of this situation, a man likr: Hitler 
with his charismatic ability and mad character could easily sway a 
P' ople to follow his pa th. When any country puts its faith in a r:-1a.L 
as a leade:r, it looks for guidanc('.;, And Hitler was that man who 
based b.is ideology of dictatorship upon racism, national social is:::., 
and ir.:periciisn. Furth" rmore, Lord Acton was not wrong when he stated 
th.2.t "nowi::r tends to corrupt and absolute: power tends to corrurt 
absol-:..:tsly." 
Yet, Davidson maintained that 
it w::lS cr;rtain, howcv(;r, that they [the Geman peoplE] 
al1 knew a great deal about the persecutions ar.d that 
th0y n0ve:rthelr~ss took arms against the world to keep 
th"se !'I"' n in power. The trial. therefore was the trial 
o i' the Gr::nnans • 9 
Th ;;c;_rcr.ibcorc ~rials probably tried the German pcopl~' in a sr:nsc, 
1Jut ~~hr-. p0oplE~ thcmselV'-~S should not receiVf-:: the E':r:.tire bla:::<.-~:. '.~'h\ 
Gr,rna.r! l adcrs of the Nazi govcnm1ent led the peoplf~. HE:;,:::t.., th•<· 
'lb concept of "justice" in international law is discuss,0:cl 
by w:ri tcrE throur.,hout the annals o~n history. '.Lo E~_:go Grotius, ofter: 
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callccl the Father of International Law, 
th8 victorious statp acted on behalf of the international 
cormn.uni ty when it punished the wrongdoers providing that 
nr;i the-ff thr prince nor his followers had bf~en invol vod 
4 ~ +·n·" '"·ron'rc• com'"l.0 ttr.d 10 ~-• >J t""_;: V"ll -'· .QO .. lUd. -__:. e 
On thr-: other side, 'Ihomas Hobbes declart)d a ruler to be bound by no 
rules but his orm. hachiavelli instructed his master in the rules 
of the rs1entless struggle of political life and in the rules of 
survival. Tb; i:::ighteenth-centur'J Swiss jurist, liinmerich von Vat tel, 
wrote in his Dro:i.t des Gens: 
!:':' thr:rcforr, thE,re was anywhere an unquiet nation always 
r.--ady to damagi: others and to cross them, to bring theri 
doncstic troubles, there is no doubt that everyone would. 
lu2. vc: th-;" right to join together to restrain it, to 
punish it., and E'Vr~r: put it forever out of the possibility 
,..,J:> ' • - ' ' 11 '"'~ aoir:b aanagf,, 
Cp:prrJ1cin st.E ted: 
~·::r: richt of "t.bc bslligercnt to punish, during ths war, 
sucl~ h'ar criminals as fall into his hands is a wc.ll-
:rc::0cn:.z• d rrinci:;:il0 of International Law. It is a 
ric;r~t of 1'hich he may effectively avail hil'lsLlf after he 
r:i'.s occ:;.pied all or part of enemy tcrri tory, and is th·Lls 
in the position to seize war criminals who happen to b~; 
there. fo; may, as a condition of the armistice, impose 
i.;pon the authorities of the defeated State the duty to 
hand over pf;rsons charged with having committed war 
crinr·8, r~·rsardlcss of whether such persons are pn;sent 
in the t~,rri tory actually occupied by him or in the 
territory which, at the successful end of' hostilities, 
br is in &. position to occupy. Fbr in both ca::r:s thr 
. ~ 
i:cc~:ssd r.:.rf' 1 in effect, in his power., •• ~'°" 
On"; could co on forever with givin::; the pros s.r.d ccr:~, r:;i." .)·.~.Le:· 1 
but s-:vc·ral th:i.ngs are CE::rtain: (1) tfill.t justice, in rct,cl"-'- t0 11!",0,t 
lO!bid,, 1 O 
- p. ~. • 
11 (~uoting Eb:ncrich von Vattel in Ibid., 10-11 t 
r; r7 ".:: r·, 
t -1: 
tbr.: Allir_,s had done, H&s not handro out; (2) that thc·re was a crrtain 
amou,11t of vengeancs; (3) that neutrals should have tried th(; German 
Nazi leaders; (4) that Speer and Sauckel were not innocent; and (.5) 
that th,::re was no firm basis in international law spccifyinG "trial 
of war criminals." 
Sh(';ldon Glueck stated that "Nur(;ntberg was ur.likdy to become a 
precedent in donestic law but a precedent in internatonal law. 1113 
But one nust rei:i.embcr that 
we can only pray that we may not be so tested, and in these 
awful tines we must prepare ourselves, should the awesor.c 
choice bo impos~d upon us, to react, even under duress, in 
the right way.1 · 
~::i.nston Churchill also warned: "So perish all who do the lil:.e 
1 r: 
acair.t. tt•J 
?or an educated and exploring person lookinG into the i'<::cts 
of a;; rvsnt or into the depths of a personality, a.r. indcptr. study 
is nt::c"ssary. How::ver, one may wonder if events happened ir: a 
ccrtair. lit;ht othc~r than they did, and why they happened th~ way 
they did. Or maybe, one may look at what could J:1ave happer:r=;d, Y r:;t, 
to thf; trained and cautious historian, the facts arc the nost css•,.ntia.l 
clue i:,o his study (sine(': it is impossible for one to operc.-v'. GLLi::.·· 
cicn tly). Rnalisn prevails over idealisn in th(:; tr2,im'·cl histo:!:'i,:,:·. 1 -:; 
Hor1d, wd th<-o search for what happened can be attained cy no ctfr.:t 
11 
-'Glueck, Huremberc Trial and Aggressive War, pp. 9c:-1oc.. 
14Philipp FdLl, "The Ghosts of Nurenbcre," ktla:1t1c : ~9 ('.:c:,1-c:" 
1972): ?,QI 
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a.nd. t.o ,judge them in an CJ\.'J)erienccd effort is the :job of the historian, 
'l'hcrcfore, in final judgment, the author o:f this study wishes to gi vc 
his owr: su'Tlr.la tion. 
There is no other conceivable thing so horrid in the estimation 
of man than the cruelty cYJ1ibited by another. And when a whole race 
of human beings an) involved in total annihilation, the fact of man's 
inhumanity to man is even a greater abomination. Throughout the 
history of mankind, one sees races, peopl€s, and creeds being subjectd 
to har:::.hncss and total destruction. Yet, when one looks at raa.n, he: 
ca..""1. not h'Jlp sr:cing a spark of goodness in the worst of ther.i. This 
1 ec.ds o~e to a:::l: wha:i:. q ur:.li ties nan possesses. And no other answi::r 
can be ;~:::.ven when one isolates nan from his nilieu then to say trJE..t 
good, Then, one has to conclude: that the enviro;;..r~:'.::~ _ 
&round him is the catalyst, One can go a step further and poir..t 7.G 
tlv-~ ;;:.1roady established social structure, the political orgaJ1izatior., 
a:td thr::) ccononic setup or lack of these that a particular people 
posscr:~;. Rr al istically speaking, one has to have laws in ord.e:r for 
near: to li vc i!'l a ci vilizcd world. Furthernorf;, no rnc..n should tr.;· 
another o:" a crh!c when that nan or group of pc.;rsons c>rc cuil ty c 
Tho author neither condones i;ha t the: ;;;:;,z:l s di-., 
dc·c; h( c..ppro·,r,: o: the; actions taken by the Allis:::~. 
APPENDIX A 
S.AUCKEL OOCUHENTS1 
Sau-1 12 (See USA-206, *190)-PS) Decree by the FUhrer for the exe-
cution of the decree concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Labor 
Allocation, JO September 1942, •• XI-604, 605; XV-253. 
Sau-1 *13 Sauckel decree, 25 October 1942, concerning the position 
of his representatives in the occupied territories: pursuant to his 
directives they are to recruit labor for the Reich and to regulate 
employment and wage scales in the occupied territories with the aim 
of achieving greatest possible productivity,,.XI-604, 605; XV-253. 
Sau-1 15 (Sec USA-206, *3044-PS) Order No. 4 concerning recrui tr.ient, 
care, shelter, food, and treatment of foreign workers, both male and 
female, 7 Eay 1942 ..• XI-60L1-, 605; XV-253; XVIII-492, 501. 
Sau-1 **22 Order No, 11 concerning the limitation of the duration 
of the employment status of Eastern Workers as well as the granting 
of bonuses and leaves, 2J July 1943 •• ,XI-604, 605; XV-45, 253 
Sau-1 2S (See USA-227, *1913-PS) Agreement between the Flenipotc:;~t<-r:.­
General for Labor Allocation and the Gennan Labor Front concern.inc tbt 
care of foreign workers, 2 June 1943 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-253 
Sau-1 ·lHjS(a) fr:cree for the f:xecution of the decree concPn1ing 
thf; employmc"nt conditions of Ea.stern Workers, 26 I·!arch 1944 •.. XI-(04, 
(,Oj; XV-li.5, 25J, 259; XVIII-498 
Sau-1 -:.t67(a) Sauckel decree, 11 April 1942, concerning wartime 
employment of youth: all male and female pupils from the age of 
10 ar~; to be employPd in agriculture; some schools are to be closui. .. 
XI-604, 605; XV-253, 259: XVIII-500 
::.;au-1 -i<82 From an address by Sauckel to the labor recruitmC;nt :::t.2.fi::: 
6 January 1943, on principles of recruitment in occupied tcrri.tori.cs: 
labor draft; good treatmEmt; no promises that Ci:lnnot be kept; as;::;urancc:: 
of best possible protection of life and heal th; propaganda :for C.~ rm:.tn:: •.• 
xr-C.05; xv-15, 185, 253, 260 
*Ibcu.11ents reporduccd in IHT Ibcur:ient Volum,:;s XXV-XLII. 
**lloctc':',cnts r .. :;ferred to in TI·1T Ibcu.r:i(;nt Volunes XXV-.t:LII. 
1The Sauckd documents listed below recciv(:d the P.Xhibit 
numbers stated ( not identical with Sauckd document numbers). 
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9?. 
S;:;.1~-1 '33 Circular tc dl Gaulei ters of the NSDAP in their capacity 
as commissioners for thP. employmP..nt of labor ••• XI-605; XV-253, 260; 
XVIII-505. 
Sau-1 85 "The Nature of the Commitment of Labor in Greater Gennany" ••• 
XI-605; XV-?5J, 260. 
Sau-1 ~6 Highlights of an address to the president of the Gau employ-
m<:0nt offices, 24 August 1943, in Weimar ••• "Service to the People--
nighest Purpose" ••• XI-60.5; XV-137, 2.5J, 260; XVIII-503 
Sau-1 -M-88 From a speech by Sauckel to the presidents of the Gau 
Labor offices, 17 January 1944: Germany's power and good treatment 
of foreigners made a success of the labor program; significance of 
good reception camps in the Gaue ••• SI-60.5; XV-253, 260; XVIII-503 
Sau-2 *6 ~cerpt from Himmler decree, 20 February 1942, concerning 
rP.crui tf.lr·nt and employment of Eastern Workers; Recruitment by comm issio"' :· 
of the Reich hinistry for Labor; billeting in closed shelters, if pos-
sibl0 fenced in by barbed wire; constant guard, subordination to 
Stat-:-; I-oliCP measurf:S, •• XI-604, 60.5; XV-253 
Sau-~ J2 r·ron the convention concerning the treatment of prisonE~rs 
of wa:r, 27 July 1939 (Reichsgesetzblatt, 1934, Part II, p, 227) •• , 
XI-604, 605; XV-253, 256 
::i::::~11-t ~:~G _.:.:tract fror.i a Sauckel memorandum. 26 August 19~,2, cone<:·:·.::.:, 
"':rr,c::.:.::-:c::-,t. o:n prisoners of war: sufficient rations on the ons hand 
c:.nd willing:wss to work on the other are required for full productivit:.-
•. JI-:::o:.~' (05; xv-253' 256, XVIII-488 
Sau-: 39 Instruction sheet for the general conditions applying to 
the c::'ploymc:nt of prisoner-of-war labor, 20 March 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; 
!V-253, 2.57; XVIII-488 
Sau-C. 47 Food rations for prisoners of war and Eastern Workers 
(fr:cr:::0 E by thf~ Reich I·:inister for Food and Agricul tun,, 8 Cctobcr 19:,:~) •. , 
xr-i:oi:~, CO); XV-2.53, 258 
Sac.-::.: 52 T~ibutP- by the Eastern Workers: Decree of the .:10ich 
:·.~ r::l: '-t:::· of' ?i.nance, ? ;:ieptcmber 191¥2 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-45, 253, :::.'.h; 
XVllI-LJ.98 
'3::1..i-·) *24 Sauckel prcclamation, 20 April 1943, to all laoor allocatio: .. 
,):ff'icr: s: necessity of total employment of the population oi all oc-
t.:upi'd tr:rri tories; principles of most efficient labor allocation; 
c::1pl0yFJ::nt o:f Gennans as cadres and leaders; training for :.rades; 
reM:1J-~<.: tion according to production and oropr~r tr•:a :.r.J.<::nt o :, for(:igr: 
\;ori·c::: •••• XI-605, XIV-631; XV-253, 260; XVIII-502, 50.5 
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Sau-4 *16 Extracts from Sauckel decrefJ for plant managers, concerni.ng 
employment and labor conditions of Eastern Workers, 25 June 1942: 
just treatment; wages in accordance with comparable German wage scale; 
German Labor Front is charged with care of workers; State Police 
will handle serious infractions of work discipline, etc·. ; no leaves; 
no religious care by either foreign or German clergy ••• XI-604, 605; 
XV-253; XVIII-501 
Sau-4 **31 French agency for the care of French wor}c;ers employed 
in the Reich ••• XI-604, 605; XV-37, 253 
Sau-4 *'*49 Circular decree of the Plenipotentiary General for 
Labor Allocation, 21 July 1943: food rations for prisoners of war 
and Ea.stern Workers ••• XI-604, 605; XV-253, 259 
Sau-5 95 Excerpts from Sauckel's speeches; documents from the 
Times of Changes and Reconstruction, 1934 ••• XI-606; XIV-607; XV-60, 
61, 253, 260; XVIII-506 
Sau-6 96 National Socialist Governm€ntal Activity in Thuringia, 1932-33 ••• 
XI-606; XVI-607; xv-253-60 
Sau-7 97 Excerpts from The Activity of the Thuringian Regional. Govern-
ment 1933-34 ••• XI-606; XIV-607; XV-254, 260 
Sau-8 93 (See RF-5) Europe Works in Germany, Didier, 1943: "Sauckel 
Kobilizes the Labor Reserves" ••• XI-606, 608; XV-254 
Sau-9 94 Affidavit of Dieter Sauckel •• ,XI-606; XV-254, 260; XVIII-505. 
*~Jau-10 (See USA-206, *3044-PS) Affidavit of Carl Goetz, former 
member of the Dresdner Bank Directorate, 21March1946 ••• XV-206; XVIII-
483, 502 
Sau-11 .Affidavit by Hahn, 8 ftiarch 1946, and chart showing calories for 
Gt:rman and foreign workers, Eastern Workers and Soviet prisoners of 
war •.• XV-270; XVIII-500 
Sau-13 2 Chart showing method of inspection and administration of 
labor, •• XV-33 
Sau-14 J Chart showing Sauckel's executive staff ••• XV-207 
**Sau-15 (See USA-206, *3044-PS) Interrogation of Iar~;, former 
G€rman Hinister of Agriculture, 22 May 1946 ••. XV-6; XVII-417 
Sau-16 Interrogation of Seldte, former G<'..::rman Labor Minister, 27 
Hay 1946 •• ,XVII-417 
Sau-17 Interrogatory of Voss, medical officer, on camp conditions,,, 
XVII-418; XVIII-501 
Sau-18 108 Interrogatory of Scharmann, C..ennan Public Health officiaJ., 
7 May 1946 ••• XVII-418; XVIII-501 
Sau-23 117 A£fidavit, 2 July 1946, by Heinrich Fa.lkenhorst, former 
chief of the Reich Nain Office in the Party Charcelltry: a few days 
b~forc the occupation of Weimar, SauckE>J. had tr,lephoned him that, 
because the competent authorities had made no decision concerning 
Buchenwald Concentration Ca.mp, he believed it his duty in the interest 
of the Weimar population to order the camp to be surrendered intact 
to the JU.lies ••• XVIII-505 
Sau-T (See USA-206, *3044-PS) Appointmm1t of the Plenipotentiary 
General for Labor JU.location, 21 March 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-2'J-l-
Sau-8 (See USA-208, *1666-PS) Order for the execution of the decree 
by the Fuhrer concerning a Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, 
of 27 Harch 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; x.v-255 
**Sau-9 Order No. 1 concerning the appointme.nt of the Gauleiters a::; 
deputies for the commitment of labor in the Ga.uP, 6 April 1942 ••• 
xr-604, 605; xv-255 
**Sau-10 (See USA-206, ~2044-PS) Position and treatment of workers 
from the East .•• XI-604, 605; XV-2_54; XVIII-483 
Sau-11 Order No. 5 concerning tht=i exclusive competency of thE! agencie:::; 
of the Labor ConHni tmcnt A&ninistration for the acceptance of order::; for 
the allocation of workers, 11July1942 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-255 
**Sa.u-1Li. (See USA-206, *304J.i--PS) Order by th~ ReichsfUhrer SS and 
Chief of the German Police, of 13 November 1942, concerning marking 
of Eastern Workers ••. XI-604, 605; XV-254 
Sau-17 Decr13c concerning the employment conditions of thE:: ::astern 
Workers, JO June 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-44, 255; XVIII-492 
**Sau-18 (Se~ USA-206, *3044-PS) Circular concerning thf; enploymrnt 
of i.astem Workers; instruction sheets for plant manager.:; and &..sterr: 
Workers, 4 August 1942 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-254, 257 
**Sau-19 (See USA-206, *3044-PB) Cooperation between the- agencic::; o:· 
labor conuni tment with the Gau dircctorat-:·s ••• XI-6()'.;., 605; ZV-27, 2:; .. ; 
XVIII-502 
Sau-20 Service contract for forPign dom1=?stic fomaJ.~· hnlp ... XI-604, 
605; ;:v-255 
1The Sauckel doCU.'T!Pnts given be:low did not receiV(· Sauckel i:cxhibi ~ 
nu':tbers and are therefore listt=:d by thr~ir Sauc.kcl docUJ'P'.~·nt ~:umbf~r~ \ac 
compiled in the Sauckel Document Book and prc_:.sr,n ted. to the :.:ourt). 
er 
/..I 
Sau-21 Decree concerning thP. work book for forden workers, 1 May 
1943 •.. xr-604, 605; xv-255 
**Sau-23 Order No. 13 for the assurance: of order in factories, 1 Nover;-.-
bc,r 1943 ... XI-604, 605; XV-39, 255 
**Sau-26 Order for the regulation of err:plo:Y'rvnt conditions of the 
female Eastern Workers, domestically employed, 24 July 1944 .•• XI-604, 
605; xv-256; XVIII-499 
·HSau-27 (See USA-206, *3044-PS) Decree of the German Labor Front, 
4 September 1942, concemin g position of foreign workers in the factory 
.•• XI-604, 605; XV-254; XVIII-501 
**Sau-30 Order No. 14 concerning the creation of a Reich inspectorate 
and the tasks charged to it ••• XI-604, 605; XV-256 
Sau-33 Decree by th8 Reich Hinistry of Labor of 10 July 1940 conccrninr, 
employment of prisoners of war •. ,XI-604, 605; XV-255, 2.56 
Sau-3 5 Decrcr; by the Reich Ifiinistcr of Labor 01· 7 April 1942 concern in; 
craploynent of prisoners of war •.• XI-604, 605; XV-255, 256 
*·*Sau-37 The cmploynent of French prisoners of w&r., .XI-604, 605; 
xv-255, 256 
Sau-JS Visiting o:f Italian, French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners of 
war by their relatives in the Reich., ,XI-604, 605; XV-255, 256 
"'"-Sau-4-0 OrdYr No. 9 concerning the crCJJ:lination of shd t'"'r, food, 
hf'n.tinc, and maintenance of the camps by ca"'.lp mechanics, 14 July 1942 ... 
XI-604, 605; xv-255, 257 
*·XSau-41. (Sr;e USA-206, *3044-PS) Publication by thi: G:.ri;1&J1 Labor 
Front of 4 August 1;i42: thf; maintenance of the canps for - astc:rn 
1-:Crkcrs is charged to ihe G.-'man Labor Front ••• XI-60'+, 605; XV-2_9:;., r c_'. 
' . .I' 
~7'.Sau-42-43 Camp di:;cree o: 14 July 1943 concerning foreign work ere .•. 
XI-6<J-r, 605; xv-255, 258; XVIII-500 
"**Sau-44 l)~crcB concerning the shEJ.tering i.n car;ps of workPrs i'oc. 
the duration of the war, 14 July 194J ••• XI-6CV.J., 605; J:V-'i.55. 25c1; 
XVIII-500 
S01u-'..r5 Moat inspection law of 29 Octobr-~r 1940. I .XI-604, 605; xv-255, 
?58 
Sau-h6 Food ra.tion card regulation for foreign civilian woykcrs, 10 
Lruly 1942 ... XI-604, 605; xv-255, 258 
Sau-1.J.8 Decree regarding the taking along of food during travel of 
foreign workers to their homeland, 9 June 1943 •.. XI-604, 605; XV-255, ~ 
Sau-50 Decree concerning the taxation and the legal treatment of the 
workers from thn Occupied 1 astern TerritoriP-s, 20 January 1942 .•• XI-6~ 
605; XV-44, 255, 256, 259; XVIII-498 
Sau-51 Circular decree of 13 July 1942: transnittal of wages to the 
Occupied Eastern Territories .• XI-604, 605; XV-255, 259; XVIII-498 
-l!·*Sau-54 Explanation o:f ordor No. 11 of 23 July 1943 concerning the 
granting of bonuses to Eastern Workers ••• XI-604, 605, XV-255, 259 
**Sau-55 1be transmittal of wages of foreign workers and employees •.• 
xr-6Q4., 605; xv-255, 259 
**Sa.u-57 Decree concerning Christmas bonuses for Eastern Workers, 
6 December 1943 ••• XI-604, 605; XV-45, 255, 259 
**Sau-58 Decree concerning the employment conditions of Eastern 
Workers, 2.5 l'.ia.rch 1944 •. ,XI-604, 605; XV-45, 256, 259; XVIII-498 
Sa.u-.59 Decree concerning an equa1i7.B.tion of payment for the employment 
of :foreign workers, 11 August 1944., .XI-604, 605; XV-256, 259 
HSau-60 Regulations for health provisions of the .;_astern Workers ••. 
xr-60!-:-, 605; xv-255, 259 
Sau-60(a) :iJccrec of the General Plenipotentiary for the Allocation 
of Labor concerning hospital and institution costs ••• XI-6()4., 605; 
xv-255, 259 
Sau-61 Accid.r:ntal inf;urance for foreign workers during transportation 
..• xr-604, 605; xv-255, 259 
Sau-62 Circular ord~r concerning the supply of clothing and shoes to 
Eastern Workt=:rs P..mployed in the Reich ••• XI-604, 605; xv-255, 259 
Sau-fil•, The provision to Eastern Workers of the Reich with items o;· 
nsw clothinE .•• XI-604, 605; xv-255, 2.59 
Sau-64(a) Labor commitment of foreign workers; loss of luega.Ge in 
tra.nsit ••• XI-604, 605; XV-255, 259 
Sau-65 Order about the use of foreign doctors, phamacists, dfmt.ists, 
and dent.al tr:-,chnicians ••• xr-604, 605; xv-256, 259 
·x-~sau-67 Rcgulatfon concerning the industrial prot•!ction o: fordgr. 
workers and :..astem laborers ••• XI-604, 605; xv-256, 259; XVIII-499 
->H-:Sau-68 !fodicaJ. care for workers from thf~ Eas:. •• ,;-:r-60l+., 605; 
XV-25.5, 2.59 
9? 
Sau-80 (Rcjectcd),,,XI-606 
Sau-81 "Manifesto of Labor Allocation" .•. XI-60_5, 607; XVIII-41:39 
**Sau-89 Article enti tlf:d "Revision of Employment Conditions of 
~.astern Workers" ... XI-605; XV-256, 260, XVIII-500 
Sau-90-91 (Rcjected), •. XI-607 
Sau-92 (Rejected.) ••• XI-606 
Sau-99 Order specifying attendance of male and female Red Cross 
nurses at transports •. ,XVII-418; XVIII-501 
Sau-100 Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1943: investigation o: sanitary measures 
in camps •.• XVII-418 
Sau-101 Mr:raorandum for French prisoners of 'h'ar on leave., ,.XVII-l+18, 
XVIII-497 
S2.u-102 Reichsgcsctzblatt: Emergency services order ••• XVII-419 
Sau-103 Rcichsgesr::·tzblatt: Conpulsory labor decree .. ,XVII-419 
Sau-108 Affidavit of the recruiting officer in the :ast; Sauckcl 1 s 
activities ••• XVII-419, 420 
Sau-109 List of Sauckel's decrees ••• XVII-419, 420 
Sau-110-112 Laws dealing with the position of the Reich Defons(~ 
Co~nr:ission~;r and with the allocation of labor ... XVII-419, 4 2 0 
Sourer~: TI-iT, Vol. 24, pp. 233-38, (Defense fucumr:nts). 
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APPENDIX B 
SPEER OOCUNENTS 
-xs:p-1 L;J Hcmorandum, 20 September 1944, from Sper::r to Hitler: 
GoebbP.ls and Bonnann designate both the "self-responsibility" of 
industry as conceived by Speer, and Speer's ministry as "inimical 
to the Party"; Speer's task is unpolitical; only voluntary zeal on 
part of the plant managers could increase i:>roduction •• XVI-4JJ, 446 
*Sp-2 47 F'rorn a speech by Speer, 9 June 1944, to representatives 
of the Rhenish-WestphaJ.ian industry on the "self-responsibility" of 
industry introduced by him in 1942; before 194?.--management by state 
authorities; after 1942 by experts in annament production; the authority 
of the plant manager must never be limited, •• XVI-4J4 
Sp-3 11 Copy of Speer's notes on a discussion with Hitler, 21/22 
J.larch 1942, on Hitler's disagreement with treatment of Russian 
civilian workers, •• XVI-440; XIX-192 
Sp-4 13 Copy of Speer's notes on a discussion with Hitler, 30 Earch 
1943, concerning better rations for Russian and Genna.~ miners,,. 
XVI-!.~L;O; Y.IX-192. 
Sp-5 q Copy of Speer's discussion with Hitl~'.r, 11/12 Septcmbl'lr 19:;,::_;., 
concerning id(;ntical. rations for Italian and Geman anna.r:ient f'acto:~:lr ~, 
, , • XVI-4l:·O; XIX-192 
*Sp-6 44 Letter, 7 May 1944, from Dr. Walter Schieber, fonner 
chir:;f of the A:i:nament Supply Office in the Spc(;r Ministry to Spi:!cr: 
offenders who have served their sentence are being transferred to SS 
plants operating in connection with concentration camps and arc thus 
lost to the armament. industry; foreign workers are being transfsrrrod 
to SS plants by the Police for slight misdemeanors; strong objr ctior: .. 
to i'urthcr encroachments by the SS economy •• ,XVI-442, 473; XIX-20'? 
" ' 
+:·S:p-7 42 Goring decrc-e, 22 April 1942, concerning thP establishri- r:~ 
of th~.' "Cr:ntral Planning" within the "Fbur Year Plan." Chir,;fs: 
Spr:r-r, Eilch and KSrncr; tasks: decisions concerning planning, 
distribution of raw materials, etc,, .XVI-453; XIX-190 
Sp-8 2 Copy of excerpts from minutes of the neetinG of th0 Central 
Planning Board on 26 January 1943; statement by Sp(·er on recruiting 
Gn·mans for the a:mament industry., ,XVI-461-i-, L}65 
( ... , ..... 
/~' 
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-l<:Sp-9 3 Connent by SpeGr in the course of a meeting of "Central 
Plruming". 21 December 19lt-3, on diff(!rneccs bctwe(:n himSE;lf and Sauckcl: 
Spr:,er believes that F're:nch workers on production work for G€rmany 
should stay in France •.• XIX-187 
*c 10 4 T 1 t 4 • 1nltJ .r.- c t r ral Cf.;.. ·d · 4 }'- • ·-..;p- (; c YJY,, January ;r-r-}, .i.rom ... peer o l.7E:ne ... ,_,,, -r, .... n r:;;.Tl.:c.: 
workers in "priority plants" (Speerbetriebr:) in occupied terri tori(;S and 
in Italy to be spared deportation to GE1rmany ••• XVI-467 
Sp-11 5 Copy of letter from Speer to Sauckcl, 6 January 1944, con-
cerning inactivation of Gennan factories and their transfer to occupi~d 
territorif:s •. ,XVI-467; XIX-187 
Sp-12 8 Copy of Speer's notes on a discussion with Hitler, 19/22 
Jun•: 191.J.4, concerning prod.uction in the occupied Western terri torfos ..• 
XVI-468; XIX-188 
*Sp-U L~5 From the conferences, 3 to 5 Junp, l 9LJ.4, between Spscr 
and Hitl'°'r: Speer complains to Hitler that every month 30 to 40,000 
forGign workers or prisonr.;rs of war recaptured by the Police after 
f1.ight attempts arc assigned to work in SS plants, their labor thus 
br:,ing lost to other industries •• • XVI-47l~ 
Sv-14 15 Copy of excerpt from memorandum from Speer to Hitler, 
Dcitel, GOring, 30 Jun£; 1944, concerning inability to produce :f"urcls 
•. • XVI.J.rf,5; i:I.X-211 
Sp-15 16 1290-PS Copy of top secret report from Speer to Hitler, 
30 August 19Ltl*, concerning situation of C..2errnan chenical industry 
following very sGrious air attacks ••• XVI-485; XIX-211 
Sp-16 25 Copy of letter from Speer to Gauleiter Simon, 5 Sept('ffib<:~r 
1944: instruction not to destroy the "Ninctt(:" ore mines in Luxr:mbour[, 
in casr, of capture by the Allies ••• XVI-487 
Sp·-17 21 Copy of telE:type order from Spe,,:r to variou:::; Gauld tcr:::, 
14 September 1944, to paralyze industries to be· evacuated in thr.; ~:c::t 
. , .i:VI-429 
~sp-lG 22 'l'clctype, 15 Sc:ptembor 1944, fron Sper.r "',,;o Bor;;arm con-
~aining directives from Speer to all Gau Leaclsrs of the we st.err. G;::.c.,, 
regarding procedurr~ for rnndling plants and production in c:,sc uf 
r:vacuation .• , XVI-l~89 
:)p-19 4c3 Copy of extracts from Hitler's protocol, 19/20 1~u:~st 191}li, 
acrccing with Speer's plan not to destroy industri<.s to b<: rvacw.;.t.-]d 
•. ,;:n-490 
Sp-20 17 Top-secret memorandum from Sp<::i:or to riitl· r, 11 ;;ovcI'lb•;:r 
1944, concrc:rning dif'ficul ties of coal supply and. .;-;roductior: in Uw 
Rub.r c;,,rea, .. XVI-491; XIX-211 
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S1)-21 49 Extracts from a mr,morandt.t.n: from SPPCT to G:;neral Guderian, 
15 Decemb0r 1944, on thn impossibility of' continuing war in casP 
Silesian coal regions are abandoned ••• XVI-491; XIX-211 
Sp-22 18 Copy of memorandum from Speer to Eitlt.r, JO Januar; 1945, 
on anticipatsd desperate position of th•..: Gcrr:.ar1 arma-::cnt industry 
F•;bruary /March 194-5 •.. XVI-491; XIX-211 
*Sp-23 26 Hemorandu.rn, 15 March 1945, from Speer to Hitlr:r: final 
collapse of German ~~conomy to be expected within a month or two; 
military continuation of the war not feasible after collapse; lost 
war not the fault of the people; destruction not justified at this 
stage of the war •.. XVI-497; XIX- 211, 214 
*Spe-24 JO Letter, 29 !"larch 1945, from Speer to Hitler: re-quest 
for rescission of the Hitler destruction order, 19 tr.arch 194 5 . •. 
XVI-l+-93; xrx-211, 21J 
-)!Sp-?) 27 Hitler destruction order, 19 March 194.5; all inportant, 
installations and objects within Reich territory which thF Enemy r,~.;~h-: 
utilize for the continuation of th0 fight ar~ to br. destroyed •.• 
XVI-499; XIX-213 
·XSp-26 28 Order by the chief of Wehrrnacht transportation, 29 Harci1 
1945, ir:lplemcnting the Hitler destruction ordr:,r oi' 19 i:arch 1945; 
tra::·ic comm.:nication insta:,.1ations arE:· to br; destroyed r~ntircly 
.. . xv·1-499 
Sp-27 46 1764-PS Copy of an announcement o:f a Hitlc r ora~r by 
Bom.c..nr:, 23 i·iarch 19L1j, to all Gauleiter on completf' evacue.:.ion o~ 
c:.vilians from territories exnected to br~ taken by :.h~~ Allirs, .• 
XV-1JJ, 181-i-; XVI-499 
*Sp-2[', 31 Decree by Hitler, drafted by Speer, 20 harch 19h5, 
iripler:wnting the Hitler destruction decree, 19 harch 1945: dcstrucLio-·. 
of industrial installations is intended to mak:(; i.'Tlpossiblc their 
utilization by the encmy4 •• XVI-501; XIX-213 
"Sp-29 32 Speer's implementation directives, JO J.zych 1 ~...._ j, to 
Hitlr::r's decrre of the same date: Speer'r.:. d(JCrce prrtai.r:ir+: w ct;, 
paralyzing o:f industrial and supply plnnts rer.iains in fore<~; ~;:::-o­
duction to be continued to the last noncnt r-Vf~n in 2i t:;a tic.:·.-~:- o :·· 
r::xtrr::r: dif:f'icul ty •.• XVI-501 
"''Sp-30 19 Speech, 16 April 1945, ri:::cordcd by Speer in Har.b;,irg; 
a.ddi t:lonnl harm to German economy to be avoided. at 1,his s of th<::-
war; there is to be no more destruction or pare.lyzing o:f Tlcc!H,s, 
~o:::r:u:nication installation, etc. in G'.'nnany and occu:-iicd t- :r:::-i t.orirs; 
political and Jewish inmates of concentration c2 .. rr:,'s :.o be s·-.:rrr.rnio·r;d 
to cns~~.y troops; "Werewolf" to cease C:!.Cti vi ty imm' clic:; tPly; :::oous-::u:ffs 
l-t':'.Vf 1JriorHy in transportation, etc •.• XVI-503 
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*Sp-31 6 Letter from Speer to Sauckel, 28 January 1 C)lJ.4, conparing 
('.:!ilployraent of woml';!n in war work in l:ngland and Gennany ••• XVI-589 
*Sp-32 7 Letter, 11 ff.arch 1944, from Speer to Sauckel: workers in 
Fn=:nch armanent factories not to bP transferred to Gennany despi tr:: 
Sauckcl's decree of February 1944 ••• XVI-589 
Sp-33 29 Copy of the order for the execution of Hitler's 19 March 
1945 order •.• XVI-.589 
Sp-34 14 Copy of an order from Hitler to Speer, 21 April 1944, 
concerning construction of six buildings.,,XVI-.589; XIX-209 
Sp-3 5 61 Excerpts from Speer's notes on points under discussion at 
Hitler's conference, 3/5 J·anua.ry 1943, concerning use of French labor 
,,,XVI-.589; XVII-428; XIX-187 
*Sp-Jp 50 Undated answer to questions by Speer's defense counsel 
by Hans Kehrl , former head of the Planning and of the Raw Material 
OfficEO in the Speer Ninistrjr: SauckP.l. himsP..l.f allotted labor to 
the usi::r agencies; he did not recognize the authority of "Central 
Planning" or of Speer to issue directives .. ,XVI-.589; XIX-190, 198 
*Sp-37 51 Answers to questions by Speer's defense counsel by Dr. 
Walter S~hicber, fomer head of the Ann.ament Supply Office in the 
Spoer Iii nis try, 2 to 6 Yia.y 1946: Sau ck el negotiated directly with 
user agencies; majority of Gau Leaders and others fought against 
"self-responsibility" of industry as conceived. by Speer. Speer 
opposed attc~tps of the SS to participate in the direction of 
industry,,,XVI-589; XIX-190, 207 
-»Sp-38 52 Intcrroga tion, 3 April 1936, of Schmel tor, former head 
of the Labor Allocation Office in the Speer Ministry, by Speer's 
defense counsel and a representative of the Prosecution: statement 
concerning the methods used in requisitioning labor; SS very often 
assigned concentration camp prisoners directly to industrial plant~ 
without informing the Speer Ministry: Speer requested protection fo;.· 
workers in ~riority plants (Speerbetriebe) in occupied territories; 
SpP.cr requisition concentration camp prisoners but they w~re offered 
him as labor by thf.: SS; Sauckel assured Speer up to 194-1+ that forr';ign 
labortrs came to Ge:rmany voluntarily •• ,XVI-577, 590 
*Sp-39 53 Interrogation, 10 Hay 1946, of Dr, Hupfauer, forr.ior 
chief in the Central Office of the German Labor l<"'ront and liaison 
man between the Labor Front and the Speer Ministry, by SpbE:r's 
def.-:·nse counsel and a representative of the Prosecution: Sauckcl 
alone was responsible for the mobilization and allocation of labor 
forces and for the working hours of all employees; worl::ing hours wert· 
the sa.':lc for foreigners and Gennans; Speer Wc.illtr:-0.. total mobilization; 
he could not issue orders to Sauckel; differnncr:s of opinio:1 bctwccr; 
Speer and Bornann; Speer was opposed to cher.iical warfare; in 1945 
h(, wanted to withdro.r1 800,000 workers fror: the urma'ii.cnt indtrntry to 
repair r.'ar da':lage; other topics. , • XVI-590. 
Sp-l~O .)'J- Interrogation of SauE'r, fonncr o:fficial in the Spr:,r;r 
Linistry ••. XVI-590 
Sp-41 55 Interrogation of Frank ••• XVI-590 
*Sp-42 56 Interrogation, ~~O Hay 1946, of Wal tr;r Rohland, former 
head of the St•,;cl Production Department in the Speer Ministry and 
deputy of the Plenipotentiary for Armament .8conomy in the P.henish Buhr 
region, by S:oc,er' s defense colll1sel and a representative of the Prosc:-
cution: allocation of workers assigned by Sauckel to the arrr,arnr:~nt sector 
was the task of the Speer hinistry, but the practical implenentation 
was a natter for the labor offices subordinated to Sauckel.. ,XVI-.590; 
XVIII-476 
*Sp43 57 Interrogation, 2 Nay 1946, of the witness Kempf, Speer's 
private secretary, by Speer;s defense counsel and a representative 
of the Prosecution: in spring 1944 due to an illness, Speer did not 
attend the: "Central Planning" conferences; he was against ths con-
struction of the six subterranean pursuit plane factories; r.ot a 
member of the SS; conff"rence by Speer with Hitl<:o:r, f:nd of Earch 1945, 
j.n which SpEfr opposes Eitler's d€struction plans; oth0r matters ..• 
XVI-590 
+:-Sp-44 5e Int<:rrogation, 10 Nay 1946, of G';neral Guderian, fc:rmcr 
Arr.cy Chief o~c· Staff, by SpH::r' s defense counsel: mf;asurE;S by Speer 
to 1Jrrvrcni destruction of bridges, roads, and vital installations, 
etc ... XVI- .590 
*Sp.-'... 5 .59 L'rlterroga tion, 1 and 2 Hay 1946, of Dietrich Stahl, for1·1<.: r 
liaison man to the heads of the main comni ttees of the Technical c:;·::·ic'., 
by :3pser' s defense counsel a.r:d a representative:; of the fros0cution: 
;:.>peer's :;;ilans, F'ebrua:ry and March 1945, for the elimination of Hithr, 
::Somc:_.nn, Gor:bbcls, and Himrr.ler by poison gas ••. XVI-590 
Sp-46 60 Intc-rrogation of Karl Brant ••. XVI-590 
Sp-lJ,7 61 .Answer to questions by Spoer' s defense counsel, :L, June 
1946, by Uanfred. von Poser, former liaison officer of the 1,r.y 
(}nc::r2.J Staff to the Speer Ministry: during the withdrawc..l of Gc:nr:2.!. 
troops from occupied territory S11eer made great efforts w :;:.reserve 
ccono:.ic installations; Speer ordered about 15 food trains :o tb iiLil:::: 
r .. rca after it was occupied in order to prevent a fo:.ine •.. ;)::1-~::,9,~ 
Sp-4~; 62 Interrogatory of witness Hans EaJ.zachcr, industri~~1it,t, 
J .i\ur:ust 19L~6 . .. XXII-:396 
7 Sp-h9 63 r::fidavit, 27 Aueust 1946, by Baur~bach, forr;-r-:".' co::;bat pi1o:: 
at the r:nd of the war SpPE)r did more than any other ~:;c.nnar, w asstirr_ 
thr; necnsstties of li.fc for thc: (~ rr:~an p· opl' ; ciue to 3pu~r' s ul.rr:cth" ~. 
to Bau::Jxwh non<: of the responsible pr:·rsons in th, ·:nird fr ich t:r rt 
ablr to leave Germany by air; Spr.::~:r persuaded the C..e.u Lcad•c·::C o~· Ew;:bu::::-c 
to Gurrr:;nder !:a!':burg to the Allic;s w1thout res:i_Gfa;.~,cr • t tc ..•. x~:1r-
APP2NDIX C 
LO!IOON AGREEHENT 01'' 8 AUGUST 1945 
Agrcer.Kmt by the Government of 
the United States of America, 
the Provisional Government of 
the French Rt: public, the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern 
Irela...VJ.d, and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics for the Prosecution 
and Punishm2nt of the Major 
~lar Criminals of the 1\lropean 
Axis. 
WHERbA.3 the United Nations havrj from time to time made de-
clarations of their intention that war criminals shall be brought 
to justice; 
Mm \ifHER:SAS the Eoscow Declaration of JO October 19hJ on 
Gsrr.ian atrocities in Occupied Europe stated that those German of-
ficers and mccn and m0mbers of the Nazi Party who have been respons-
i bl s for or have ta.ken a consenting pa.rt in atrocities and c::-:·ime:s 
Hill be sent back to the countries in which their abominabls ci.e~:cis 
were done in order that they may be judged and punished according tc 
th1; laws of these liberated cuuntries and of the fru: Govern:%nts tha~. 
will be created therein; 
AND ~11IEREAS this Declaration was stated to b8 without prro-
judicc to the case of major criminals whose offEnses have no parti-
cular gsographic location and who will be punished by the point dr·cidc. 
of' thF: Goverm1ents of the Allies; 
AND THEREFORE the Governmr:mt of the Uni tr:d States of ;\ra~ric:~, 
tho Provisional Governmr,nt of the l''rench Republic, the Govcrmrir:or:t 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britian and Northern Irdand, ar"c tl:. 
GovsrrL"lsnt of the Union of Soviet Socialist fo:publics (hereina:f':.<:?.: 
callr:~d "the Signatories") acting in the interests of all th< ,Jr.:. iJ ~. 
I:ations and by their representatives duly authorized thereto r..:.v.:~ con-
cluded. this AgreemE:nt. 
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tOIJ. 
/~:rticlr: 1. The-re shall bs (;stablishcd after consultation with thr 
Control Council for Gnrma.ny an International Military Tribunal for 
th•: trial of war crirainals whosf~ of1~enscs have no particular gc,o-
Eraphical location whether they be accused individually or in thd:r 
capacity as m<::mbers of organizations or groups in both capacitiEs . 
.Articl~, 2. The constitution, jurisdiction, and functions of the 
International Lilitary Tribunal shall be those set out in thr: Charter 
annexed to this Agreement, which ChartE:r shall form an intE::gral 
part of this Agreemrnt. 
Articlf" J. Ehch of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps 
to r.iake available for thr: investigation of the charges and trial 
th1: major war criminals detained by them who are to be tried by the: 
Int~;rnational Military Tribunal. The Signatories shall also use 
tl10ir best endeavors to make available for investigation of the 
chargns against the trial before the International I•:ili tary Tribunal 
such of thte' najor war criminals as are not in the territories of any 
of the Signatories, 
i1rticlc 4. Nothing in this Agreemmt shall prejudic£' the provisions 
ostablished. by thrc f<ioscow Declaration concerning the rr-::turn of war 
cri."linals to th,, countries where they cornni ttcd their crimes. 
Article> 5, Any Govc-rrunent of the United Hations r.'.ay adhere to this 
1;g:rc c:".cnt by notice givr.,n through the diplomatic channel to the 
Govcrr2_,:nt of the> Unitf:d Kingdom, who shall inform the othr:r signa--.o:r:,r 
and adhc:ring Govr~·rmncnts of each such adherence, 
,~rticlr: 6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice thE; juris-
d:.ction or the powers of any national or occupation court establ:'..:::.lYc. 
or to br established in any ;.J.licd tcrri tory or in Gem.any for th•_ 
trial o·'" war criminals • 
.. ;rtich: 7. This Agrer-:ment shall come into force on the day of signa.tur 
and srcll rcnain in force for the period o:f one y12ar and shall co::-
tir:uc t.h(:reafter, subject to the right of any Signatory to c;ivr , 
-:.hroCi£:b the ciiplor:iatic channel, one month's notic(", of intention to 
v·:cmir..atP it. Such termination shall not prejudicr: any proc"':cdinc..;s 
dr1 .c::.dy taken or any findings already madr: in pursuanc<: of thls 
AcrecEsnt. 
IF l:JTnESS 'I/HEREOF th0 Undersigned have sign.Pd the prcssnt. 
Agrr+r.~_nt, 
OONE in quadruplicate in London this 8th day of August 1945 
i:::ach in English, Fr0nch, and Russian, and P.ach :.~~xt to havr; (-.qucu 
2.uthr-.:-:ticity. 
I_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Fbr the Government of the United States of America 
/s/ ROBERT H. JACKSON 
For the Provisional Government of the French Republic 
/sf ROBERT FALCO 
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland 
/s/ JOWITI' C. 
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics 
Isl 
/s/ 
I. NIKITCHENKO 
A. TRAININ 
Source; n~r, Vol. 1, pp, 8-9; NCA, Vol, 1, pp. 1-3. 
APPENDIX D 
CHARTER OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
I. Constitution of the 
Internationi Mili.tary Tribunal 
Article 1. In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th day of 
August 1945 by the Government of the United States of America, the 
Provisional Government of the French Republic, the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall 
be established an Internation 'Military Tribunal (hereinafter called 
"the Tribunal") for the just and prompt trial and punish.'llent of the 
major war criminals of the E'uropeail Axis. 
Article 2. The Tribunal shall consist of four members, c.1.ch with 
an alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed 
by each of the Signatories. The alternates shall, so far as they 
are able, be present at all sessions of the Tribllllal. In case of 
illness of any member of the Tribunal or his incapacity for some 
other reason to fulfill his functions, his al tern.ate shall take his 
place, 
Article J. Neither the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates 
can be challenged by the Prosecution, or by the defendants or their 
collllsel. Each Signatory may replace 5.ts mel'!lber of the Tribunal or 
his alternate for reasons of heal th or for other good reasons, except 
that no replacement may take place during a Trial, other than by 
an alternate. 
Article 4, 
(a) 
(b) 
The presence of all four members of the Tribunal or the 
alternate for any absent member shall be necessary to 
constitute the quorum. 
The members of the Tribunal shall, before any trial 
begins, agree among themselves upon the selection 
from their number of a President, and the Presidf:n t 
shall hold office during that trial, or as may other-
wise be agreed by a vote of not less than three 
members. The principle of rotation of presidency for 
successive trials is agreed, If, however, a session of 
the Tribunal takes place on the territory of one of the 
four Signatorif;S, the rep:resentative of that Sic;natory 
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on the Tribunal shall preside, 
(c) Save as aforesaid the Tribunal shall take decisions by 
a majority vote and in case the votes are evenly 
divided, the vote of the President shall be decisive: 
provided always that convictions and sentences shall 
only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least three 
mf:mbers of the Tribunal. 
Article 5. In case of need and depending on the number of the 
matters to be tried, other Tribunals may be set up; and the 
establishment, functions, and procedure of each Tribunal shall be 
identical, and shall be governed by this Charter, 
II. Jurisdiction and General Principles 
J1rticle 6. 'lbe Tribunal established by the .Agreement referred to 
in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major :.;ar 
criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to 
try and punish pe:rsons who, acting in the interests of the European 
Axis countries, whether as individuals or an members of organizations, 
committed any of the following crimes. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within 
~he jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual 
rPsponsibili ty: 
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEA.CE: namely, planning, pre para tior.., 
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a 
war in violation of international treaties, agreener.ts 
or assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or 
Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the fore-
going; 
(b) WAR CRIN.ES: namely, violations of the laws or cu~toms c: 
war, Such violations shall include, but not be lirniteu 
to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor 
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or 
in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of priser;.: r:::. 
of war or persons on the seas, killing of hos tagE,s, pl uri:i.r_ ~· 
of public or private property, wanton destruction oi' c:i.tir:s, 
towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity; 
( c) CRII>!ES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extemina tion, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts cora-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during 
the war,* or persecutions on political, racial, or re-
ligious grounds in execution of or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrate~. 
*Conuna substituted in place of semicolon by Protocol of 6 
OctobGr 1945 
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Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating 
in the formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy commit 
any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by 
any persons in execution of such plan. 
Article 7. The official position of defendants, whether as Heads 
of State or responsible officials in Govern.~ent departments, shall 
not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating 
punishment. 
Article 8. The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of 
his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, 
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determine that justice so requires. 
Article 9, At the trial of any individual member of any group or 
organization the Tribunal may declare (in connection with any act 
of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organi-
zation of which the individual was a member was a criminal organization. 
After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give such 
notice as it thinks fit that the Prosecution intends to ask the Tribunal 
to make such declaration and any member of the organization will be 
entitled to .apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tri-
bunal upon the question of the criminal character of the organization. 
The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application, 
If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what mannC'::-
the applicants shall be represented and heard. 
Article 10. In cases where a group or organization is declared 
criminal by the Tribunal, the competent national authority of a.11y 
Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for 
membership therein before national, military, or occupati<•n courts. 
In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organization iG 
considered proved and shall not be questioned. 
Article 11. Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged 
before a national, military, or occupation court, referrt:d to in 
Article 10 of this Charter, with a crime other than of membership 
in a criminal group or organization and such court may, aftr:;r con-
victing him, irqo s e upon him punishment independent of and additional 
to the punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in the 
criminal activities of such group or organization. 
Article 12. The Tribunal shall have the right to takE! proceedings 
against a person charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this 
Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the TribunaJ.., 
for any reason, finds it necessary in the intrffests of justice, to 
conduct the hearing in his absence. 
Article 13. The Tribunal. shall draw up rules for its procedure. These 
rules shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter, 
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III. Committee for the Investigation 
and :Prosecution of Najor War Criminals 
Article 14. Each Signatory shall appoint a Chief Prosecutor :for thP 
investigation of the charges against the prosecution of major war 
criminals. 
The Chief Prosecutors shall act as a committee for the following 
purposess 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
to agree upon a plan of the individual work of each of 
the Chief Prosecutors and his staff, 
to settle the final designation of major war criminals 
to be tried by the Tribunal, 
to approve the Indictment and the d.octunents to be 
submitted therewith, 
to lodge the Indictment and the accompanying documents 
with the Tribunal, 
to draw up and recommend to the Tribunal for its 
approval draft rules of procedure, contemplated by 
Article 13 of this Charter. The Tribunal shall have 
power to accept, with or without amendments, or to reject, 
the rules so recommended. 
The Committee shall act in all the above matters by a majority 
votP and shall appoint a Chariman as may be convenientand in accordance 
with the principle of rotation: provided that if there is an equal 
division of vote concerning the designation of a defendant to b~ 
tried by the Tribunal, or the crimes with which he shall be charged, 
that proposal wD.l be adopted which was made by the party which pro-
posed that the particular defendant be tried, or the particular charc~:z 
be preferred against him. 
/:rticle 15. The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting 
in collaboration with one another, also undertake the following dutif:s: 
(a) investigation, collection, and production before or at 
the Trial of all necessary evidence, 
(b) the preparation of the Indictment for approval by the 
Committee in accordance with paragraph (c) of Article 
14 hereof, 
(c) the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses 
and of the defendants, 
(d) to act as prosecutor at the Trial, 
(e) to appoint representatives to carry out such duties as 
may be assigned to themr 
(f) to undertake such other matters as may appear necessary 
to them for the purposes of the preparation for and con-
duct of the Trial. 
It is understood that no witness or defendant detained by any 
Signatory shall be taken out of the possession of that Signatory with-
out its assent. 
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IV. F'air Trial for Deff':ndants 
Article 16. Lr! orckr to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the 
following procedure shall be followed: 
(a) The Indictment shall include full particulars specifying 
in detail the charges against the defendants. A copy 
of the Lridictment and of all the documents lodged with 
the Indictment, translated into a language which he 
understands, shall be furnished to the defendant at a 
reasonable time before the Trial. 
(b) During any preliminary examination or trial of a defendant 
he shall have the right to give any explanation relevant 
to the charges made against him. 
(c) A preliminary examination of a defendant and his trial 
shall be conducted, or translated into, a language 
which the defendant understands. 
(d) A defendant shall have the right to conduct his own 
defense before the Tribunal or to have the assistance 
(c) 
Articlr: 17. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Article 18. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
of counsel. 
A defendant shall have the right through himself or 
through his counsel to present evidence at the Trial 
in support of his defense, and to cross-examine any 
witness called by the Prosecution. 
V. Powers of the Tribunal and · 
Conduct of the Trial 
The Tribunal shall have the power: 
to sllr.lmon witnesses to the Trial and to require 
their attendance and testimony and to put questions 
to them. 
t0 interrogate any defendant, 
to require the production of documents and other 
evidentiary material, 
to administer oaths to witnesses, 
to appoint officers for the carrying out of any 
task designated by the Tribunal including the power 
to have evidence taken on commission. 
The Tribunal shall: 
confine the Trial strictly to an expeditious hear.ine 
of the issues raised by the charges, 
take strict measures to prevent any action which 
will cause unreasonable delay, and rule out 
irrelevant issues and statements of any kind 
whatsoever, 
deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appro-
priate punishment, including exclusion of any defendant 
or his counsel fror.i some or all further proceedings, but 
;;ithout prejudice to the detem.ination of thP. c!k1.rges. 
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Article 19. The Tribunal shall not be bound by ted"u1ical rules of 
evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent 
8xpeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence 
which it deems to have probative value. 
Article 20. The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature 
of any evidence before it is offered so that it may rule upon 
the relevance thereof. 
Article 21, The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common 
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also 
take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports 
of the United Nations, including the acts and documents of the 
comr.li ttees set up in the various Allied countries for the investigation 
of war crimes, and the records and findings of military or other 
Tribunals of any of the United Nations. 
Article 22. The pennanent seat of the Tribunal shall be in Berlin. 
The first meetings of the members of the Tribunal and of the Chief 
Prosecutors shall be held at Berlin in a place to be designated 
by the Control Council for Germany. The first trial shall be held 
at such places as the Tribunal may decide. 
A:·tic1P 23. One or more of the Chief Prosecutors may take part 
in th~ prosecution at each trial. The function of any Chief Prosecutor 
may bs discharged by him personally, or by any person or pf.rsons 
authorized by him. 
The function of counsel for a defenda..~t may be discharged 
at the: defenda..11t' s request by any counsel professionally qualified 
~o conduct cases before the Courts of his own country, or by any 
other pr'rson who may be specially authorized thereto by the Tri bur~al • 
Article 24. 
course: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(er) 
\b 
The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following 
The Indictment shall be read in court. 
The Tribunal sh:l.11 ask each defendant whether he pleads 
"guilty" or "t1ot gull ty", 
The Prosecution shall make an opening statement. 
The Tribunal shall ask the Prosecution and the 
Defense what evidence (if any) they wish to sub-
mit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall ruls upor, 
the admissibility of any such evidence. 
The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be exar:.ined 
and after that the witnesses for the Defense. 
Thereafter such rebutting evidence as D.ay be held 
by the Tribunal to be admissible shall be callc,d by 
either the Prosecution or the l})fense. 
The Tribunal may put any question to CJ.ny witness and 
to any defendant, at any time. 
:'he Prosecution and the Defense shall ir:terrogate 
and may cross-examine any witnesses and any defe~dant 
who gives testimony. 
(h) 
(i) {j) 
{k) 
'Ihe DefE.nsc- shall address th€ Court. 
The Prosecution shall address thE Court. 
Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal.. 
The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce 
sentence. 
Article 25. All official documents shall be produced, and all 
court proceedings conducted, in Lnglish, French, and Russian, and 
in the language of the defendant. So much of the record and of the 
proceedings may also be translated into the language of any country 
in which the Tribunal is sitting, as the Tribunal considers desirable 
in the interests of justice and public opinion. 
VI. Judgment and Sentence 
Article 26. The judgment of the Tribunal as to the guilt or the 
innocence of any defendant sha.11 give the reasons on which it is 
based, and shall be final and not subject to review. 
Article 27. The Tribunal shall have the right to impose upon a defendant 
on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be detennined 
by it to be just. 
Article 28. In addition to any punishment imposed by it, the Tri-
bunal shall have the right to deprive the comricted person of any 
stolen property and order its delivery to the Control Council for 
Germany. 
Article 29. In case of guilt, sentences shall be carried out ir. 
accordance with the orders of the Control Council for Germany, whic:l; 
may at any time reduce or othe:r·wise alter the sentences, but may r;_,::;t, 
increase the severity thereof. If thP. Control Council f'or Gennar.y, 
after any defendant has been convicted and sentenced, discovers 
fresh evidence which, in itsopinlon., would found a fresh charce 
against him, the Council shall report accordingly to the Conmittce 
established under Article 14 hereof, for such action as they may 
considPr propBr, having regard to the interests of justice. 
VII·. Expenses 
Article 30. The expenses of the Tribunal and of th0 trials, shall 
be charged by the Signatories against the funds allotted for main-
tenancP of the Control Council for Germany. 
Source: IHT, Vol. 1, pp. 1016; N~A, Vol 1. pp. 4-11. 
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